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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this dissertation is that there is a certain dependence of Heidegger's "destruction of the history of ontology" in Being and Time on an understanding
of certain part/whole relations, the theory of which is developed Husserl in the Third
Investigation of his Logical Investigations. I try to show in various ways that Heidegger is actually following Husserl's directions on the proper method of part/whole
analyses, that he relies on the very distinctions which Husserl draws, that he uses
much of the very same language as Husserl, and that all of this is essential to Heidegger's procedure, though he never refers to Logical Investigations explicitly as the
source of his style of part/whole analyses. Is it fair, then, to say that Heidegger is
clearly and evidently using Husserl's Third Investigation as the method of his "destruction"? I'll bet it is; but I cannot claim to have proven that. But that isn't really
the point here. What I wish to argue for is rather that the logical force of Heidegger's
"destruction," what is logically compelling about it, is found in its reliance on those
formal relations which Husserl explores thematically in the Third Investigation. The
main value of this thesis is the light it throws on reading Being and Time, as well as
other work of the continental tradition founded in Heidegger's analysis of "the
worldhood of the world." Moreover, it is an attempt to extend the sort of formalizing,
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"cross-over" (analytic/continental) studies recently made of Husserl to the broader
realm of Husserl's influence on the tradition of continental philosophy.

*

*

*

*

Logical Investigations is generally regarded as most significant because it is

the work in which Husserl began his career as the founder and proponent of phenomenology. Prior to LI Husserl had been concerned primarily with problems in the
philosophy of arithmetic; and his orienta~on to the philosophy of arithmetic had been
psychologistic, an orientation of which he becomes the strongest critic with LI.
Husserl appears to have made a complete break with his earlier work and to have
made a new philosophical beginning with LI. Thus, if one is primarily interested in
Husserl as the phenomenologist, it makes sense to start with LI, to regard it as really
the first work in Husserl's career, and to read it from the perspective of that towards
which it points forward. Moreover, this view is somewhat encouraged by Husserl's
own remarks in the Forward to the Second Edition: "My Logical Investigations were
my 'break-through,' not an end but rather a beginning.'i1

1

Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. Findlay, 2 Vols.
(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982), 43. The English translation by Findlay will be
abbreviated in the following as "LI.'' "LU'' will be used in references to the German
edition, Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd Edition, 1913, 3 Vols. Vol. I: Prolegomena
zur reinen Logik. Vol JIil: Untersuchungen zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der
Erkenntnis. Vol. 11/2: Elem ente einer phiinom enologischen A ufkliirung der Erkenntnis
(Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, Verlag, 1980).
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There is another view emerging in the recent literature, which sees LI as more
of a transitional work than a beginning work. True, LI is Husserl's "break-through"
into phenomenology. However, phenomenology can be seen as a solution to Husserl's
earlier problems, i.e., the problems upon which the psychologistic approach of his
Philosophy of A rithm etic had foundered. This is the view taken by Dallas Willard. It

is a view also supported by Jonathan Cooper-Wiele and Jay Lampart, though we will
follow more closely Willard's development of it, as I think his work is the most
thorough and well formulated. Willard tells the story of how Husserl's solution to one
particular, peculiar problem developed into the wider revision of the principles of
human knowledge that is phenomenology. This was the problem of how "blind
calculation" (calculation through merely, non-intuitively manipulating arithmetic and
mathematical symbols) was possible.
It is especially important in the present context to consider Willard's thesis, as

it says something important about the place of phenomenology in the tradition of
philosophy, and this will have an important bearing on the present thesis. At the heart
of the matter is the issue of transcendence, a theme more readily associated with
Heidegger than Husserl. "Transcendence" for Heidegger is one of the names, along
with "Being-in-the-World," which is equivalent to "Dasein." The issue of transcendence is Platonic in origin, particularly in the context of the ontology of the world.
Reflection on transcendence largely fell into disfavor after Descartes, whom Heidegger
says "missed the phenomenon of the world." Indeed, the modem, scientific worldview seems to find little use for any reflection on transcendence. It would appear to
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be a theme more appropriate to a religious or a medieval outlook, more natural to men
who wanted to think beyond the world, toward a divine origin, motive and force, men
who wanted to think the world as ens creatum, or as governed by providence. This, as
we know, was all banished from the modem view of the world through the rejection of
final causality as a form of natural explanation. And it is one of the remarkable
features of Heidegger's philosophy to have revived a reflection on transcendence
precisely as a thought beyond the world, as disclosive of the world. The very
language of this philosophy is enough to make some scientifically minded philosophers
wince, if not to denounce it as an atavism and embarrassment to philosophy. However, it was with a serious scientific purpose that phenomenology initiated a reflection on
transcendence, as part of a W issenschaftslehre in Husserl, and extended to a systematic
reflection on the world and its disclosure in Heidegger. What Willard argues for is a
view that finds the origin of the transcendence problem, as Husserl understood it, in
Husserl's earliest philosophical perplexity, which was with the problem of how it was
possible to reason truly and with objective accuracy in the field of mathematics by the
use of a mere symbolism.
I will not here try to prove Willard's thesis, but rather let his own extensive
researches stand as compelling, if not sufficient documentation for it. I am rather
interested in examining the evidence for extending the formal, analytic approach to
interpreting the development of phenomenology beyond LI, by showing how a certain
formal development of Husserl's thought within LI is evident in Heidegger's application of Husserl's phenomenology in Being and Time. It is my view that the birth of
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phenomenology was primarily a formal and analytic innovation in philosophy. There
is an increasing body of Husserl studies which are analytically oriented, and most of
these have been motivated by careful attention to Husserl's work up to and including
LI, especially the Third Investigation. Some of this work, in particular Peter Simons'

brilliant Parts, has actually been concerned with attempting a complete axiomatization
of the part/whole theory, towards which Husserl tentatively projects six formal
propositions. While this analytic attention has been drawn to Husserl's own work, the
pertinence of these studies beyond Husserl's work, and in particular to Heidegger, has
not drawn any attention, and it is hoped that I can contribute to that here. Moreover, I
will not be concerned with developing or testing any sort of formal axiomatization, but
rather more with merely showing how this most formal component of Husserl's LI is
operative in Heidegger's analysis of the world and the concept of worldhood.
I think much is to be gained from this approach and especially by a demonstration of how the formal element of Husserl's thought carries over into Heidegger's
philosophy. On the one hand, it calls attention to the formal, analytic po~ibilities of
reading works of the continental tradition. Husserl clearly always understood himself
to be developing a new logic, new canons of evidence, a method of reasoning, a
Wissenschaftslehre. And it is Husserl's method that Heidegger claims to be following

in Being and Time. The continuing influence of Husserl, as methodologist, in the
continental tradition, even where others have set themselves in opposition to him, has
probably been its most enduring feature. Yet, logic per se has been more or le~
consigned to the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It is worthwhile exploring how
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phenomenology's original logical theses have governed, if only implicitly, in the
development of continental thought. On the other hand, the serious analytic and
scientific importance of continental philosophy should not be missed on analytic
philosophers. In deconstructing the Cartesian metaphysics of the world, Heidegger is
challenging the most scientific of philosophies in the most analytic of ways. Far from
rejecting scientific thinking, Heidegger is perhaps challenging it as not yet scientific
enough, not yet sufficiently grounded in the given, in the evident enough, but pervaded
by a deficient dogma of transcendence (a transcendence which it never really grasps
thematically, or thinks philosophically). His later essays on technology and scientific
thinking especially point to the urgency with which he held to the importance of
thoroughly understanding the character of scientific and technological reasoning,
thought and understanding. Clearly, Heidegger means to speak to the same audience
to which Descartes spoke, and at least partially to unseat Descartes as the philosopher
of scientific principle.
The point here, following Willai:d, is to view LI as neither end nor beginning,
but rather more as the beginning work of an elaborate solution to the problem which
Husserl had discovered prior to LI. In the Forward to the First Edition of LI, Husserl
explains that he came to the work after meeting "unavoidable problems which have
constantly hindered, and finally interrupted, the progress of my efforts, spread over
many years, at achieving a philosophical clarification of pure mathematics." 2 His work
began with the study of formal arithmetic and the theory of manifolds and became
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interested in "the universal essence of the mathematical as such." He was interested in
the evident possibility of generalizing what was essential to mathematical reasoning
beyond its tradition quantitative applications and in the development of a general
"mathematicizing logic." Thus far, we can see that his aspirations coincided with
those of many logicians and philosophers of the tum of the century. However, there
was a further problem: "I began work on the prevailing assumption that psychology
was the science from which logic in general, and the logic of the deductive sciences,
had to hope for philosophical clarification." 3 And in many respects he found this
method of psychological clarification instructive. "But once one had passed from the
psychological connections of thinking, to the logical unity of the thought-content (the
unity of theory), no true continuity and unity could be established." 4 This, Husserl
explains, was the point on which the Philosophy of A rithm etic foundered. And nearly
the whole of the Prolegomena to LI is occupied with criticizing the attempt to found
logic on a psychologistic basis.
Husserl's arguments against psychologism are similar to Frege's arguments in
"The Thought," the first essay in Frege's own Logical Investigations, though Husserl is
more exhaustive in examining the various forms of psychologism. It is not important
here to go through all of the many examinations, criticisms and arguments against
psychologism, though we should say something here about the general outlines of the
problem. In Husserl, as well as in Frege, it boils down to the fact that essentially

3

LI, 42.

4

LI, 42.
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nothing is ever truly explained in this way. What Husserl referred to ( cited above) as
the problem of "the logical unity of the thought-content" still remains after one
transfers the locale of this unity, its reality, from someplace such as within external
objects to the interior of the psyche. The same exercise is carried out in sociologisms
and biologisms, which are really just modifications of the more explicitly psychologistic theories. We could say that what is at issue in the conflict with psychologism
is whether our questions should be directed to the truth and validity of reasoning or
the causal (perhaps real and efficient) connections of the act of reasoning, judging,
believing, etc. Psychological theories pertain no more nor less to incorrect reasoning
than to correct reasoning; and thus to take psychological theories for a philosophy of
logic is really just to miss the point at issue; and this is the main reason for the
foundering of psychologistic projects in logic: the logical problems are all restored in
full at the end of it all.

This is the meaning of the slogan "To the things themselves!"

Psychologism is merely a detour to the problems of logic; it is merely an apparent
path to logical and epistemological explanation. Heidegger will further erode psychologism, by undermining the traditional understanding of how both persons and things
are "in" the world, "belong to" it or are "part of' it; and this argument, as will be seen,
is dependent on the results of Husserl's Third Investigation. But here we are only
interested in the issue of psychologism as it pertained to the famous foundering of PA.
The return to the things themselves is turned into a basic methodological item for
Husserl, and this is the first ground cleared in LI.

9

The rejection of psychologism only ended an aspect of Husserl's pre-LI
researches.

There still remained Husserl's original problem of achieving a philo-

sophical clarification of pure mathematics, and especially of giving an account of how
calculation by the mere manipulation of symbols, was possible. The thesis regarding
the transitional character of LI is best summarized in the first sentence of the preface
to Willard's Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge:
This book [Willard's] undertakes to explain how Husserl's early concerns
for a philosophical elucidation of number and of the formal methods of arithmetic led to comprehensive reflections upon the problem of the objectivity of
knowledge, and how his resolution of that problem in turn led to the conception
of philosophy as a rigorous or exact science-which he later came to call "Phenomenology ."5
Willard here makes a strong statement of the transitional thesis on LI, which is that
what develops in it is the extension of a solution to a problem in the theory of
numbers and arithmetic. I will not try to review the many details of the long version
of the thesis presented by Willard in Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, but will
sketch rather broadly the outlines of it presented by Willard in his article "Wholes,
Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge,116 though we will also draw somewhat on
Willard's longer work, as well as cite relevant portions of LI itself. The main objective here is to secure a clearer interpretation of LI, and, to this end, I have relied
heavily on the secondary sources regarding the pre-LI work of Husserl rather than

5

Dallas Willard, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: A Study in Husserl's
Early Philosophy (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1984), x.
6

Dallas Willard, "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge," in Smith,
Barry (ed.) Parts and Moments (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1982).
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venturing an original interpretation of my own of this work from the original sources
to the extent that these are involved. What is at issue here is merely whether the
available interpretations of the pre-LI work fit with the reading I'm offering of LI.
First, we learn from the interpretations of the early work that Husserl was
highly influenced by his studies with Karl Weierstrass, for whom knowledge of the
domain of number could and should be rigorously ordered. This is a desideratum
which never leaves Husserl; it is a key sounded in the Introduction to the Prolegomena
of LI; and we can see it still as a prominent feature of Husserl's thought in Cartesian
Meditations near the end of his career, with its highly Leibnizian language of "com-

possibility," "incompossibility" and the like, as well as in his continuing deployment of
the language of manifold theory. Phenomenology, the Wissenschaftslehre, was always
to be highly ordered, and in a fashion always familiar to students of number theory,
sets and manifolds. A science for Husserl is characteristically systematic, as it is its
systematic character that makes a body of knowledge something more than mere
collection of facts and observations.

If we live through and recognize the presence of inner percepts, singly or in
groups, we have knowledge, but are far removed from science.... A group of
isolated bits of chemical knowledge would certainly not justify talk of a science
of chemistry. More is plainly required, i.e. systematic coherence in the theoretical sense, which means finding grounds for one's knowing, and suitably combining and arranging the sequence of such groundings. 7

1

LI, 62.
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Moreover, this is not merely an aesthetic·or arbitrary criterion for determining the
scientific status of a body of knowledge. Science, in this systematic sense, makes
po~ible a certain positive addition to knowledge which Husserl refers to as leverage.
All sciences proceed methodically in the pursuit of truth, employ more or less
artificial aids in order to bring to knowledge truths or probabilities that would
otherwise remain hidden, and in order to use the obvious or the already established as a lever for achieving what is remote and only mediately attainable. 8
It is this leverage, made po~ible by the unity of law, that makes it po~ible to use

already attained truths as a "ladder" for the attainment of "higher regions" of truth.
Husserl will always make much use of this faith in a systematic, logical order to truth.
In Cartesian Meditations it is prominent in the theory of being and non-being as

correlatives of verifying and nullifying syntheses. The attentive reader can see it, the
sense of order and leverage, indirectly expressed throughout Husserl's texts in his
frequent use (much like Berkeley) of the argumentum ad absurdum, or indirect proof
(which is also the familiar favorite of mathematicians). It is the consensus of most
commentators, including Willard, that Husserl acquired this fascination with system
from his studies with Weierstr~.
According to Willard, the specific failing of the psychologistic approach in
Husserl's Philosophy of A rithm etic was the attempt to found mathematics on an
intuitive, presentational theory of number. To understand this, it is important to understand the distinction which Husserl designates by the use of the qualifiers "authentic"
and "inauthentic." Much has been made of Heidegger's use of these terms, though I

8

Ll, 63.
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know of no study which contrasts his use with Husserl's. I think a certain relation can
be shown between these two usages, even if there is a major shift of sense, which
reflects the different character of the philosophical projects involved with Husserl's
logical/epistemological and Heidegger's existential analyses. In both cases we are
dealing with a problem of signification or meaning. What Husserl means by distinguishing authentic from inauthentic presentations is most fully developed in the Sixth
Investigation, which is also where the Investigations first reach the level of a "breakthrough" into what Husserl would subsequently pursue as the science of "phenomenology." Nonetheless, as Willard shows, the essential foundations of this course of
thought were already incipient in Husserl's recognition of the specific failing of a
psychologistic foundation for logic and mathematics.
Willard argues that "the view of mathematics . . . that Husserl held in his
early publications was not psychologistic in any of the more commonly understood
senses." 9 He did not think, for example, of numbers as something essentially mental,
and it was always the nature of the numbers themselves that he sought to explain.
One is particularly unable to find passages where Husserl advocates a psychologistic
logic of the sort which "turns logical principles (e.g., modus ponens) into inductive
laws of cognitive processes, relativizing the nature of truth, and of logical relations
such as implication, to the individual or ~o the human species." 10 "[A] psychological
analysis," says Willard, "has to do specifically with the origins of representations, and

9

Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, 111.

10

Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, 111.

13
. . . these 'origins' are a matter of the types of acts which those representations presuppose." Willard cites Stumpf for the origin of this definition of the "psychological,"
and we see the general wording is repeated by Husserl in the Forward to the First
Edition of LI: "Where one was concerned with questions as to the origin of mathematical presentations, or with the elaboration of those practical methods which are
indeed psychologically determined, psychological analyses seemed to me to promote
clearness and instruction." 11
The issue of exactly bow Husserl's early logic was "psychologistic" appears to
be an issue which bas yet only been formulated vaguely by Husserl scholars, and
Husserl himself says very little specifically about this. In the Forward to the First
Edition be does make this interesting remark on bis earlier studies:
I began work on the prevailing assumption that psychology was the science from
which logic in general, and the logic of the deductive sciences, bad to hope for
philosophical clarification. For this reason psychological researches occupy a
very large place in the first (the only published) volume of my Philosophy of
Arithmetic. 12
What Husserl appears to be saying here is that be bad not really thought much about
it, that he bad simply adopted "the prevailing assumption." Following this assumption,
he bad failed to find the sought after clarification. "I became more and more disquieted by doubts of principle, as to how to reconcile the objectivity of mathematics, and
of all science in general, with a psychological foundation for logic." 13 And this

11

LI, 42.

12

Ll, 42.

13

LI, 42.
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prompted the new researches which issued in LI.

I will not attempt here to clarify

the issue of Husserl's earlier "psychologism," nor how the refutations of the Prolegomena relate to Husserl's own earlier errors. What is important here is rather to account

for a certain transition in Husserl's understanding of the character of "presentations,"
and particularly for the distinction between authentic and inauthentic presentations.
From his studies with Weierstrass, Husserl had acquired his conviction that an
understanding of mathematics must be rigorously ordered, that there must be a unified,
transparent foundation for all mathematical knowledge. Yet, says Willard,
[t]he employment of the artificial symbolisms and formal techniques so pervasively and accurately used in the advancement of arithmetical knowledge (in the
solution of equations, for example, or in the ordinary adding up of a column of
figures on paper) clearly was not a matter of representing or thinking about munbers and number relations at all, but consisted to a very large extent of a mere
rule-governed manipulation of sense-perceptible symbols. 14
This was the problem of "blind calculation" mentioned above. What was remarkable
was that these methods worked, and they worked although various mathematicians
used different methods to arrive at identical results. Thus, there is the lack of systematic relations. More disturbing than this lack of system is the fact that reasoning about
numbers is carried on in this way without having the numbers themselves in view, but
by the use of mere sense-perceptible symbols.
Husserl initially attempted in PA to resolve this problem on an intuitionist
basis, in which arithmetic and all of mathematics would be shown to be founded on
the theory of numbers. The concept of number is first derived from the perception of

14

Dallas Willard, "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge," 382.
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a number of things. We walk into a room and see a group of people, or we look into
the heavens and see many stars, thus forming the notion of a definite plurality. Of
course, the question arises as to how we know in such instances that the group
(totality, set) is a group (totality, set), how we know what to count as belonging to the
group and what not to count. There is already in this the question of totalization, the
question of how the several members of a group are grasped as belonging to a set,
giving it a number of constituents. is The cognitive grasp of sets of individuals as
somehow connected in a set, or group, is familiarly illustrated by reference to such
things as a flock of geese, a file of soldiers, a lane of trees, a covey of hens, etc. 16
Here what Husserl calls a "figural moment" serves to symbolically organize individuals into the unity of a collection, group, set. Something like this can be supposed
operative in the recognition of the first several numbers, especially if we imagine
several individuals organized into a literal figure, as on the faces of dice or dominoes.
It is necessary to admit at least the possibility of an elementary grasp of some of the

cardinals in this fashion, as the pair, the triplet, the quad, the quincunx, as well as a
few basic compounds of these forms.
However, there is obviously a limit to the account of numbers through such
figural moments: "One need only try to distinguish 78 from 79." 17 Husserl realized

is An important study in this connection is Jonathan Cooper-Wiele's The
Totalizing A ct: Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy; though it is less concerned with
Husserl's LI, it, like Willard's work, involves a very instructive examination of PA and
the "Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic," published between PA and LI.

16

Willard's examples, LOK, 98.

17

Willard, LOK, 100.

16

that such an account only worked up to somewhere around the number twelve. Our
direct intuitive, or authentic, grasp of numbers is very soon overwhelmed. Thus, a
symbolically mediated, or inauthentic, recognition of numbers comes to appear
indispensable to account for the actually existing use of numbers higher than about 12.
For greater numbers, say 235, we must rely upon the composition of the sign itself.
Whereas the sign of a number such as 3 can be regarded as merely naming something
intuitively grasped, the sign of a number such as 235 is not a mere name, but the construct of a system, which relies on the device of place (a principle utilized equally by
roman numerals, tallies, or any known system for representing numbers higher than the
first few). Thus, the role of inauthentic presentation becomes indispensable for
Husserl in his account of number. The sign itself becomes the principal means of
access to what we grasp as numbers. Willard says of this turn in Husserl's thought,
It must be understood that, for Husserl, even though a given number can be
represented by many different symbols, the symbol used in a given case is
essentially involved in the concept of the number represented. The number is
represented as something with a certain essential correlation to this symbol
herewith used. 18
The concept of number as founded on an authentic intuition of quantities is thus
subordinated to the notion of "systematic numbers," numbers whose meanings are
derived from a system of symbolic constructs dependent on an appropriate system of
signs.
Husserl comes to see arithmetic in general, as well as the systematic numbers,
as a sort of "symbolic prosthesis," a means of extending our ability to deal with

18

Willard, KOJ, 102.

17
numbers and numerical relations. It is in fact due to the inherent limitations of human
intuition that a system of arithmetic is necessary, since otherwise we could just see
directly, without calculation, what we are only able to grasp through the arithmetical
arts. It is in this turn of Husserl's thought toward the importance of symbolic presentations that Willard sees the turn away fr!)m understanding the problem of mathematics
as a psychological task.
What, then, is the turn which constituted the "breakthrough" from the early
work to Husserl's phenomenology? And how is the new science, or W issenschaftslehre, related to these early studies?
It appears that Husserl began to see in his original problem a new problem,
which was itself a sort of solution to the old problem. The problem which at first
appeared as the problem of blind calculation in arithmetic was in fact more general. It
is the more general problem of representative and signitive presentations, where a
representing or signitive content stands as a surrogate for a represented or signified
content. The question that occupies Husserl becomes how
. . . while we are engaged with the representing contents, we believe ourselves to
be employed about the represented objects themselves. In the flow of conceptual
thinking it is in most cases optical and acoustical sequences of words that do the
representing alone or almost alone. The contents meant enter into consciousness
either not at all or only in a quite rudimentary fashion. Occasionally wholly
different contents, which stand in a distant relation to the contents meant, will
act as a surrogate for them, as when at the mention of London merely the shape
of England indistinctly comes to mind. 19

19

Quoted by Willard, in "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge," 385
from his translation of Husserl's "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik,''
Philosophische M onatshefte, 30, 159-191. English translation, "Psychological Studies
in the Elements of Logic,'' The Personalist, 58, 1977, 297-320.
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This is what I think is the most important element in what I have called the
transitional thesis regarding LI. The problem of transcendence with respect to
Husserl's thought is usually thought of as the problem of how consciousness reaches
out beyond itself to an exterior objectivity. However, the problem is not really one of
merely getting beyond an interior to an exterior space; it is rather one of transcending
one content toward another, of going beyond a representing to a represented content.
What began as the problem of accounting for the veracity of blind arithmetical
calculation, the problem of how objective and true insight is possible through the often
remote use of mathematical symbols, becomes the completely general problem of the
epistemology of a signifying consciousness.
Further, understood in this way, the Husserlian problem of transcendence is
more easily connected to transcendence as understood by Heidegger, though the
Heideggerian elaboration of the transcendence problem obviously makes some important philosophical advances. In Heidegger, for whom "transcendence" is one of the
names equivalent to Dasein, the term always has to do in some way with being
beyond something toward something; and in this form it is a pervasive schema in
Heidegger's analytic. There is involved in Heidegger's analyses the play of the thematic and transparent (or, inconspicuous), illustrated by the way things are disclosed and
understood pragmatically, in letting them be involved in the projects which employ
them. Heidegger's most famous example is that of the way a hammer is disclosed, as
a hammer, not by merely looking at it with respect to its external properties, but by

picking it up and using it, say, to nail down a shingle on a roof, where attention is not
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on the hammer directly, but on how the process of the nailing down of the shingle, a
process understood in terms of a certain in-order-to, say, in order to protect one from
the weather. In general the world, as well as things in the world, are disclosed
inconspicuously, non-thematically, transparently in a similar manner, always in terms
of a certain way of being beyond, of multifarious transcendences. This is how Dasein
is fascinated with and absorbed in its world.
There is also here, I think, a connection to be made between the Heideggerian
and Husserlian use of the distinction between what is authentic and inauthentic. If the
authentic in Husserl is the directly intuited, as opposed to the inauthentic, which
Husserl also calls the symbolic or signitive, we can see a close relation to Heidegger's
use of the terms in what at first glance appears a very diverse sense. That is, the
authentic for Heidegger is what pertains to Dasein's own, non-relational being. The
world is authentically disclosed to Dasein precisely when meaning falls away from its
involvements in innerworldly concerns, when things cease to signify, in the state of
mind which Heidegger calls anxiety. His own insistence that the distinction between
authenticity and inauthenticity should not be understood in a moral sense, but purely
analytically and descriptively, is more intelligible, if we relate his usage to Husserl's.

It is, however, perhaps ironic that where Husserl seems to extol the authentic philosophical vision, Heidegger, without mentioning Husserl in this connection, shows it to
be the comportment (perhaps the authentic Socratic comportment of the philosopher)
toward (the philosopher's own) death.
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There will be more to say in connection with Heidegger on the theme of
transcendence. What is important is to keep in mind the peculiar way in which the
problem arose with Husserl. Beginning as a problem in the philosophy of arithmetic,
it turned into a problem of thought and awareness in general. And we find already in
this early work a central element of phenomenological analyses: "while we are
engaged with the representing contents, we believe ourselves to be employed about the
represented objects themselves." This theme of the permeation of one thing by
another, the recognition of the work of symbolic protheses, is essential to what we
normally understand as phenomenology. One is reminded of Sartre's example of how
in reading the words on a page the printed letters fade to a "transparency," through
which what is said occupies one's actual attention. The later Husserlian language of
"adumbrations," of verifying and nullifyi~g syntheses, analogizing apperceptions, etc.,
all depend upon the relational schema of one thing permeating another, something
shown through something, something beyond something. Of course, I do not mean to
suggest that the theme of transcendence originated with phenomenology; it appears to
have originated with Plato. However, it is to the credit of phenomenology to have
made it a central issue, and I will argue that Heidegger can be credited with the most
thorough revival of the theme since the beginning of modem philosophy, and I will
argue that Husserl's Third Investigation plays a major role in preparing the formal
possibility of this philosophical rethinking of transcendence.
The transitional thesis regarding the significance of LI sees the problem of
blind calculation as an incipient form of the more general and fundamental problems
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regarding the issues of symbolic prosthesis, of a signitive consciousness, and finally of
transcendence. The foundering of PA, its failure to give an adequate psychological
account of the first problem, gave way to the "beginning" represented by LI, Husserl's
"breakthrough" to the form of solution that he came to call "phenomenology." LI
begins only dimly aware of the full character and style into which this solution will
develop. In the Forward to the Second Edition, Husserl discusses, in connection with
his strategy for the revision of the work, how it only gradually approaches the level of
phenomenological clarity achieved in his Ideas. The First Investigation "retains its
merely preparatory character,1120 while in the Fifth Investigation "cardinal problems of
phenomenology ... were tackled," 21 and of the Sixth Investigation he says that "[its]
fund of problems still were my pace-setter." 22 The course of the work, the sequence of
the investigations actually traces the development of Husserl's own thought, whose
course he only discovers as he carries out the work; that is, the sequence does not
express a rhetorical design, but has rather the character of a journal, almost a researchers log.
We must here voice the reminder that the work was a systematically bound chain
of investigations but not, properly speaking, one book or work in a literary
sense. There is in it a regular ascent from a lower to a higher level, and a
working of oneself into ever new logical and phenomenological insights, which
never leave the previously achieved ones quite untouched. Ever new phenome-
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nological strata swim into our view and add determination to our conceptions of
the earlier ones. 23
Husserl says he exploits this rising quality of the original work to direct the priorities
of the revision, so that while the Fifth and Sixth Investigations undergo extensive
rewriting, even reformulation, the earlier ones are mostly improved only in matters of
expression. Of the Third, he says that it underwent extensive revision, though "[a]ll
that was here needed was to assist the inner sense of the Investigation, and what I
thought were its important results, to better operation and to remove numerous
imperfections of statement." 24 Over the long course of the whole work, its transitional
character is evident, from the announcement in the Forward to the First Edition of how
it has grown out of certain puzzles in the philosophy of arithmetic and the theory of
manifolds to the fully phenomenological level achieved in the Sixth Investigation,
whose fund of problems Husserl says were still his "pace-setter"25 when he turned to
revise the work after completing his Ideas.
Let us consider, then, how the original problem of "blind calculation" in
mathematics, which Willard shows that Husserl began to understand as the more
general epistemological problem of "symbolic prosthesis," emerges toward the end of

LI. Most important, I think, is the descriptive distinction Husserl draws between
intuition and signification. The problem is already broached in the First Investigation,
"Meaning and Expression," as are certain persistent features of the Husserlian solution
23
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"Zwar soll auch ihr Problembestand allein maBgebend bleiben," LU, I, xvi.
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to it. 26 In particular, Husserl emphasizes the "act-character" of the employment of
signs in thinking: "Signs are in fact not objects of our thought at all, even surrogatively; we rather live entirely in the consciousness of meaning, of understanding." 27 By
the Fifth Investigation, he is prepared to discuss the complex involvement of signs in
thinking with respect to the "partial acts" composing particular instances of thought or
consciousness. Here, some acts subsume and comprehend acts which are subordinated
in the union. With respect to the relation between the sensuous verbal sound and the
meaning attached to it, Husserl says, "The expression is indeed perceived, but our
interest does not live in this perception; we attend, when not distracted, to the signified
rather than the signs." 28 Throughout, Husserl recurs to the above sighted peculiarity of
how experiences transcend the directly intuitive contents, such that "while we are
engaged with the representing contents, we believe ourselves to be employed about the
represented objects themselves." What is peculiar in Husserl's treatment of this theme
is not so much that things are thought to be given indirectly in experience, a thesis
more or less taken for granted in most post-Cartesian theories of sensuous experience.

It is rather his emphasis on the mediating character of the presenting contents, their
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0n this point, see Jacques Derrida's La voix et le phenomene (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967). Of course, Derrida's study is primarily concerned
with another issue. But he amply shows the transparency of signs and indicators, to
the point of their effacement, by what Derrida calls a "soliloquizing consciousness," a
point made evident by Derrida primarily with respect to the First Investigation of LI,
and this accords in important respects with the point to be made here, which is
Husserl's early concern with with "symbolic prosthesis."
21

Ll, 304c.

28

LI, 582b.

24

non-thematic presence, the transparency of their involvement, and the peculiar manner

in which they are combined in an intentionality which grasps them in the partial acts,
which are subsumed, transcended, effaced, and which we live beyond. A careful
analysis of part/whole relations in the Third Investigation, of course, prepares a way to
carefully think this through in Husserl's own novel and fruitful ways.
A better view of how the whole/part theory is involved in the reflections of
the Sixth Investigation will have to wait on the exposition below of the whole/part
theory as presented in the Third Investigation. Nonetheless, this is the place to pursue
certain aspects of the matter of the Sixth· Investigation, in order to round out the view
of LI as a work in transition from Husserl's studies in the foundations of mathematics
to his phenomenology, and especially to say how the signitive/intuitive distinction
functions towards the adequacy of this transition.
Ever since Descartes' exposition of his systematic doubt, there has been a
certain preoccupation of metaphysics with the presumption of a certain gap between
the appearance and reality of the world. It has generally grown from a wonder about
perceptual experience, as in Descartes' own examples: "for I from time to time
observed that those towers which from afar appeared to me to be round, more closely
observed seemed square, and that colossal statues raised on the summit of these
towers, appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from the bottom.1129 No doubt, the
new astronomy of Descartes' day, as well as the continuing importance of advancements in scientific instruments for extending and controlling perceptual experience
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contributed heavily to this emphasis on the perceptual. 30 Husserl's approach is peculiar
in that it moves from a reflection on signs (originally the signs employed in blind
calculation) to a reflection on perceptual objects in general and, thus, sees the latter
problem more in the light of the former. That is, he begins with a reflection on how
the perceptually given arithmetical sign is related to what is symbolically mediated
through this perceptual element, and he comes to see this as a special case of the
central problem of modem metaphysics, which in tum he reinterprets on the basis of
this special case. Nonetheless, Husserl is still centrally concerned with the role of
images (perceptual and imaginary) in the process and possibility of reflection.
For Husserl, there are two fundamental components in the presentation of an
object: the intuitive (either perceptual or imaginative)31 and the signitive contents of
the presentation. This distinction is fundamental throughout Husserl's later work,
where he always stresses the aspectualizing character of presentations; where, for
example, I see only the front of a house presented to sensuous intuition, but I am

3

°1:'m thinking particularly of the numerous accounts of the significance of the
telescope and the development of the various optics which relate the appearances
(through hypothesis) to possible causes; see especially Koyre's From the Closed World
to the Infinite Unive-rse; however, a good example is given by Peirce's explanation of
hypothesis (or "abduction") by reference to Kepler's discovery of the orbital ellipse:
Kepler's problem was essentially to figure out what sort of orbit would have a certain
appearance when viewed from a position on the earth. The new astronomy was
largely the work of an optics of celestial illusions, which was extended the appearances in general as a founding impetus to the modem sciences.
31

We are here limiting the discussion to what Husserl calls "sensuous intuition,"
which is extended at the end of the Sixth Investigation with the notion of "categorial
intuition," which Heidegger, in Being and Time and History of the Concept of Time,
describes as one of the most important discoveries of phenomenology.
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somehow signitively given a house, and not just an aspect. This is how Husserl
extends the general distinction between sign and meaning to the whole of the perceptual world. It is important to note that signitive contents are always dependent on some
intuitive substance, either perceptual or imaginary. There are no free-floating significations.
A purely signitive act would be a mere complex of quality and matter, if indeed
it could exist by itself at all, i.e. be a concrete experiential unity 'on its own'.
This it cannot be: we always find it clinging to some intuitive basis.... An act
of signification is only possible in so far as intuition becomes endued with a new
intentional essence, whereby its intuitive object points beyond itself in the
manner of a sign (whether as a sign regularly or fleetingly used). 32
However, the relation between sign and signification may be completely arbitrary:

Signitive matter has a general need for supporting content, but between the
specific nature of the former and the specific being of the latter no bond of
necessity can be found. 33
This arbitrariness does not hold for intuitive contents.
The case of purely intuitive representation is quite different. Here there is an
internal, necessary connection between matter and representing content, fixed by
the specific stuff of both. Only those contents can be intuitively representative
of an object that resemble it or are like it.34
We usually operate with a mixture of intuitive and signitive contents, in which the

weight of one or the other may predominate, but which Husserl describes as possibly
approaching one or the other limit cases of purely presentative and purely signitive
presentations.
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If we now define the weight of the intuitive (or signitive) content as the sum
total of the intuitively (or signitively) presented (vorgestellte) moments of the
object, both 'weights' in each presentation (Vorstellung) will add up to a single
total weight, i.e. the sum total of the object's properties. Always therefore. the
symbolic equation holds: i + s = 1.35
The limit cases are presented as follows:

i

=0

i= I

s

=I

s = 0

[purely signitive]
· [purely intuitive] 36

These have to be described as "limit" cases, since signitive content is never on its
own, but always "clinging to some intuitive basis," though Husserl seems willing to
leave open at least the possibility of a "purely intuitive" act. To say that the purely
signitive and purely intuitive acts are limit cases is to say that we only approach such
acts, suggesting that there is always some slight, if infinitesimal, mixture of the one in
the other.
There are certain analogies that ought to be noticed between this account of
intuitive and signitive contents and the pre-L/ theses and problems described above.
First, there is the necessity of founding signitive acts on intuitive. Secondly, there is
the issue of the arbitrary connection of signified content to the founding, intuited,
signifying content. Here, the formula is applied with complete generality to the whole
of intentionality, to all that is meant, intuited, perceived, imagined, etc. However,
applied to the field of arithmetic, this would be to reiterate Husserl's earlier discovery
that arithmetic is dependent on a system of signs, or on a symbolic prothesis. The
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arbitrary relation of signifiers to signified, moreover, makes possible the same sort of
error with respect to experience in general which emerges in the problem of blind
calculation in arithmetic. If there is an arbitrary relation between any signifier and any
signified, then what makes for the objectivity of signified contents?
The answer lies in what Husserl. calls categorial intuition. Categorial intuitions are founded acts. They are higher order acts built upon simple sensuous
intuition. Ordinary sensuous intuition does not operate blindly, but in categorially
shaped percepts. And these percepts obey the ideal laws pertaining to the understanding. However, the categorial in Husserl should not be confused with any sort of
psychological laws; they are not merely regulative of the human intellect, but of the
things themselves insofar as they instantiate the categories, and thus are determinative
of access to categorially shaped objectivities by any understanding whatsoever. Moreover, Husserl's categories are not a set of laws transcendentally deduced, but forms of
understanding which are objectively intuited from the things themselves, though not as
real (sensuous) constituents.
In the perception of a state of affairs of the sort expressed in the statement
"Gold is yellow," for example, I can see the gold, and I can see the yellow, but there
is no sensible impression that would correspond to "being-yellow."
The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predicative function,
is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. ... I can see colour, but not beingcoloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear a sound, but
not that something is sounding. Being is nothing in the object, no part of it, no
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moment tenanting it, no quality or intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal
form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived. 37
Further,
The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'it' and the 'then', the 'all' and the
'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and the determinations of number etc.--all these· are meaningful propositional elements, but
we should look in vain for their objective correlates . . . in the sphere of real
objects, which is in fact no other than the sphere of objects of possible senseperception.38
Husserl rejects the account, traditional since Locke, which says that I grasp these
constituents by reflection upon mental acts, by a sort of "inner perception," as they can
no more be real constituents of such interior perceptual objects than of exterior
perceptual objects; the same problem is merely translated from "outside" to "inside,"
without at all advancing explanation.
Husserl concludes that we simply have a form of intuition which relates to
objects in their categorial structure and that this form of intuition is distinct from
sensuous perception and sensuous imagination. In the perception of an aggregate, for
example, relations are intuited on the basis of a perception of sensuous relata.
Something may be seen to be part of something, to entail something, to exclude it,
include it, or pertain to it as a property or condition of it, to be like or unlike it, to
signify it or be signified by it, etc. Moreover, things are represented as possibilities,
necessities, probabilities, contradictions, etc. And all of this is as objectively constitutive of what is sensibly intuited as is anything which shows itself as a simply sensory
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element. Moreover, the categorial does not merely distribute what is sensory, but is
bound up with the objects founded on the sensory. "What is categorial is not bound
up with representing sensuous contents, but only and necessarily with their objects,
and yet not with them in their sensuous (real) contents." 39
On the one hand, we have a lot of freedom to categorially shape what is
sensuously apprehended, as the categorial is no real constituent of objects. "The
concrete contents are many-sided, they sustain various abstract moments in themselves,
they underlie manifold possibilities of alternation and connection. We accordingly
refer many kinds of connection to this or that moment in such contents." 40

One and

the same matter can be apprehended categorially in many ways, and we are largely
free to express diverse categorial pertinencies of objects. We can consider a river, to
use a perhaps more Heideggerian example, as a hydraulic system (subject to the closed
laws of such a system), or as the natural power and agency it represents in the course
of a dramatic human development to the romantic vision of it, or as the diverse
biological eco-system of environmental biology.
On the other hand, all these variations require a foundation in presentations
which are compounded of signification and sensuous intuition. What can be unified in
a percept is subject to governing categorial legality, such that not just anything can be
made out of anything. Only ideally consistent combinations of constituents are
possible as unities of objective experience. Thus, categorial regularities, possibilities
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and neces.sities pertain only and necessarily to the matters41 which fit them, and which
they fit, as matters formally appropriate to the respective categorial laws.
These pure laws can therefore not prescribe what forms a given matter can
as.sume, but can only tell us that, when it, and any matter in general, as.sumes a
certain form, or is capable of as.suming it, a definitely limited circle of further
forms remains open to the same matter. There is, i.e., an ideally closed circle of
possible transformation of a functioning form into ever new forms. 42
The ideal regularities of categorial law are what first give force to material determination, disallowing contradictory attributions to pertain to a given matter, and thus
malting the pos.sible permutations of experienced significance more than a free-floating
semantic revery. That is, it is with categorial law that anything truly becomes objective in Husserl. And it is certainly first with the systematic regulation of determinations provided by the categorial that the pos.sibility of a completely general science of
being emerges with Husserl.
We have seen how the problem of transcendence emerged in Husserl from the
time of his early studies in the philosophy of arithmetic and how the themes of these
early studies were involved in the development of phenomenology. It should not be
left u.nnoted that the Platonic character of Husserl's philosophy is marked both by this
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lt is important to note that "matter," for Husserl, only occasionally means
something like "stuff," or "what is subject to form." "Matter," for Husserl, usually
means the "principle of identity," and when he uses it to mean "stuff' or "what form
forms" (which he does sometimes, explicitly indicating so), it still turns out under
examination that in those places "matter" has the property of determining identity.
However, while his definition serves well to cover these other traditional senses, it also
works well in uses such as "the matter at_ hand," which is also subject to categorial
regulation.
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reliance on transcendence, a thinking beyond the sensuous, and by the discovery of a
governing ideality. Of course, in Descartes one finds a similar Platonism. However,
after Descartes, modern philosophy mostly finds the governing idealities somehow
there in the hwnan mind, or maybe in consciousness, or somehow in "the subject," or
even as necessitated by the laws constituting the possibilities of any subjectivity.43
Husserl, with his concept of categorial intuition, squarely fixes the categorial's location
in what is objectively intuited, though non-sensuously.
Categorial intuitions are associated with a certain arbitrariness to their
founding intuitions. They give a universal form to objects, subswning them under
categorial laws. A categorial intuition is founded on an intuition of individuals,
without, however, meaning the individuals, nor meaning the sensuous. It abstracts
from all that is bound to the instance, and yet it is directed to the very objectivity of
the object, to the sensuality of the sensuous and to the substantial's substantiality. It
transforms straightforward (founding) intuitions into a different level of presentations
of new objects. "What is categorial is not bound up with representing sensuous
contents, but only and necessarily with their objects, and yet not with them in their
sensuous (real) content." 44 That is, what is categorial is bound up with the objects of
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1 cannot here do justice to the complex position of Kant, for whom "the transcendental unity of apperception" could hardly count as any sort of "psychological"
principle, though I think it fair to say that Kant, with his "Copernican revolution," did
place the principle of the categories on ~e side of the subject. It is also interesting to
note that where Kant presented a preformed set of operative categories, Husserl's
categories appear to be indefinite in nwnber, and possibly of an infinite nwnber, only
to be discovered as everything objective is discovered, through intuition.
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sensuous intuition, and categorial intuition abstracts from both the sensuous element
and the individuality of the particular objects.
The intuition of arithmetical relations serves as a good example of categorial
intuition. What is intuited arithmetically has the highest order of objectivity and must
obey arithmetical laws, into whose nature we see by an intuition which abstracts from
any individual or sensuous instances. Thus, the nature of arithmetical laws is intuited
categorially. However, we generally practice arithmetic without thinking on the
arithmetical laws themselves, but on the quantities or on things quantitatively related
under the laws.
We should let this suffice as an account of the intuitive/signitive distinction in

LI, which is of obvious importance to the development of the phenomenological
movement. What it is most important to emphasize in the present context is that (I)
the development of this distinction is easily and fairly interpreted as continuing and
elaborating Husserl's early work on what he saw as a problematic, though evident,
reliance of arithmetic always on some sort of sensuously presented signs and that (2)
Husserl's development of the intuitive/signitive distinction also prepares for a radical
new perspective on the central metaphysical problematic of the modem era: the gap
between reality and appearance. In connection with the latter, which is the modem
form of an ancient problem, it is interesting to note that Husserl, much like Descartes,
is primarily concerned with problems in the philosophy of science, with the character
of the known, the true and the evident. But, where Descartes takes his stimulus from
the illusory character of perceptual evidence (e.g., that square towers look round in the
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distance), Husserl's fascination is directed to such problems as the fact that mathematics (the highest of the sciences) is dependent on a sensuous foundation in the signs
(whether imaginative or perceptual), which he subsequently generalizes to the whole of
both the sciences and ordinary evidence.
In what follows we will see that the part/whole theory plays a special role in

the development of phenomenology, and we will see how this development is carried
over into Heidegger's "destruction of the history of ontology." This "destruction" will
be viewed as largely a formal critique of modernism, which itself is viewed largely as
a revision of what we understand the world to be.

CHAPTER2
HUSSERL'S PART/WHOLE THEORY

2.1. Domain and Objective of the Investigation
The primary conceptual distinction developed in Husserl's Third Investigation
is that between dependent and independent parts, which he also calls, respectively,

moments and pieces. The distinction first arose, according to Husserl, within the field
of the descriptive psychology of sense data. Accordingly, he initiates his own discussion of it by reference to certain analyses of Carl Stumpt's in his Ober den psycholo-

gischen Ursprung der Raumvorstel/ung (1843), where the distinction is considered one
respecting the "contents" of conscious presentations, which Stumpf distinguishes under
the descriptive terms "abstract" and "concrete." Husserl sometimes uses these terms
himself to mark the distinction, where it seems that the context justifies it, although
his expressed intention is to develop the distinction as one that pertains to the ontology
of objects as such. It is a distinction which "extends beyond the sphere of conscious
contents and plays an extremely important role in the field of objects as such." 45
Husserl further helps us place the discussion by offering a list of ideas which
bear a certain similarity (in that they are treated by the same science) to this distinction:
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The systematic place for its discussion should therefore be in the pure (a priori)
theory of objects as such, in which we deal with ideas pertinent to the category
of object, ideas such as Whole and Part, Subject and Quality, Individual and
Species, Genus and Species, Relation and Collection, Unity, Number, Series,
Ordinal Number, Magnitude etc., as well as the a priori truths which relate to
these. 46
The distinction of parts into the dependent and independent, the abstract and concrete,
pertains to objects a priori, i.e., with respect to the pure possibilities of objects, or to
the possibilities of being objective. It pertains to these possibilities in the same way
the distinctions of Whole and Part or Genus and Species do, or such concepts as
Number, Series or Magnitude do. It is with the ideal sense of the distinction itself as
applicable to objects in themselves that Husserl is concerned.
Thus, for Husserl, the distinction is one that would as necessarily pertain to
the psychology of sense data, where, he says, it first arose as a topic, as it would
pertain to anything, since it applies to anything objective whatsoever. But, the
explanation of the distinction, or an account of basic principles pertaining to it, would
no more belong to psychology than would that of such other fundamental principles as
those of Number, Series, or those governing the relations of Individual to Species, and
the like.
Husserl gives a further important indication as to how he sees the distinction,
as well as the part/whole theory, as pertinent to a knowledge of objective possibilities,
when he refers to it as one of those "[d]ifficult notions employed by us in our clarific-
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atory study of knowledge, and made to work rather in the manner of a lever [Hebel] ."47 There is a certain "leverage." How do these "difficult notions" provide a
"leverage"? We need to look in two directions to understand it: (1) towards what is
elevated through the leverage, and (2) towards the source, or foundation of the
leverage. It is a leverage in our study of knowledge, and it is clarificatory ([erkenntnisklli-renden]).48 What is lifted is the clarification of knowledge. What is uncovered

in this leveraged clarification is the a priQri possibilities of objects as such, as objects.
The source of the leverage is the systematic essence of knowledge, which also
corresponds to the systematic essence of objective possibility.
The way the fundamental distinction of the Third Investigation is intended to
function, as part of the pure theory of objects, is presmnably in the same way such
notions as those cited above. Just as arithmetic pertains to any objects whatsoever, or
just as whatever is said about unity or series is said about the unity or series of any
objects whatsoever, the part/whole theory pertains to any objects whatsoever. This is
assured by Husserl's opening statement of where parts lie:
Every object is either actually or possibly a part, i.e. there are actual or possible
wholes that include it. Not every ~bject, on the other hand, need perhaps have
parts, and we have therefore the ideal division of objects into the simple and the
complex. 49

Every object is subject to analyses respecting its being a part, or having parts, or both.

And the theory of parts and wholes is to investigate these objective properties in
41
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absolute generality. "These sorts of relations have an a priori foundation in the Idea of
an object." 50 It pertains to the very possibility of being an object that there are actual
or possible part/whole relations involved.
Husserl considers his own development of a part/whole theory in the Third
Investigation only tentative. At the beginning of the second chapter, he offers some
definitions and propositions toward an ~iomatic development of the theory. And we
are told in section 24 (the penultimate section of the Investigation):
These thoughts can only be meant, and are only meant, to count as mere indications of a future treatment of the theory of Wholes and Parts. A proper working
out of the pure theory we here have in mind, would have to define all concepts
with mathematical exactness and to deduce all theorems by argum enta in form a,
.
. ally. 51
1.e.,
mathematic
Husserl will only develop as much of a part/whole theory in the Third Investigation as
in needed here in the context of his epistemological aims. To develop a completely
formalized theory would take the Investigations beyond their intended scope. He says,
"we are not here engaged on a systematic exposition of logic, but on an epistemological clarification, as well as on the prolegomena to any future exposition of logic." 52
To work out fully the part/whole theory in axiomatic form would be to "engage on a
systematic exposition of logic." While he thinks this to be of great importance to
logic and ultimately to a theory of science, his purpose in the Investigation is only to
clarify certain relations and concepts that are necessary for the epistemological
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clarification and for developing a prolegomena to any future expositions of logic. His
investigations into part/whole relations stand to a fully worked out formalization much
as an exposition of certain properties of triangles might stand to a fully formalized
trigonometry, or as some observations on matrices, series, manifolds, predication, etc.
would stand to the fully axiomatic development of ideas related to these notions.
The Third Investigation, thus, gets no further into a systematic exposition of
the logic of parts and wholes than a partial formalization and the clarification of
selected elements. The necessity of what is said about these elements is an ideal
necessity, derived from the ideas of part/whole relations, which are, of course, no
"ideas" in a psychological sense. The necessity pertains to the possibilities of objects,
and only secondarily to the subjective experience of objects. The point is to uncover
the "laws of essence" pertaining to dependent and independent parts of objects, "as
such." There could be nothing more fundamental, such as a psychology, to ground the
investigation which would not already presuppose the distinctions drawn in the
analysis. As belonging also to a "prolegomena" to any future logic, the analyses and
distinctions regarding part/whole relations could be seen as something that would
function in a future logic in the way such distinctions as the familiar Aristotelian
distinctions of contrary from contradictory propositions, or of causal from evidentiary
reasons, etc. Logic, or W issenschaftslehre, for Husserl, is not merely a matter of
elevating the expression of traditional concepts and deriving ever more subtle or
elegant expressions from them, but of discovering new elements of, or terrain within,
the a priori.
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2.2. The Essential Distinction
The distinction between dependent and independent parts is a categorial
distinction. In order to grasp it we need some exemplars, either perceptual or imaginative; and to this end Husserl employs examples from Stwnpfs Ober den psycholo-

gischen Ursprung der Raumvorstel/ung. Stwnpfs examples are perceptual, and Stwnpf
interprets them psychologically. But, where Stwnpf uses his examples "to prove the
mutual inseparability of Extension and Quality, and hence their non-independence: we
shall rather make use of them to define inseparability or non-independence, or contrariwise separability or independence." 53 The terminology, "dependent parts" and "independent parts," is Stwnpfs. However, while relying primarily in his own discussion
on the examples of Stwnpf, Husserl also shows how the problem was involved in a
certain dispute between Berkeley and Locke, although there the language in which the
dispute was couched was that of the possibility of "abstract ideas." And it may be
simpler to follow Husserl in explaining the distinction in this manner first.
Husserl refers to the way the distinction arose within the dispute between
Locke and Berkeley as "in the psychological realm, more specifically in the field of
the phenomenology of inner experience." 54 Berkeley, in arguing against the possibility
of "abstract ideas," says that we can recall things previously seen and take them apart
and put them together in various ways, so that we can, say, imagine something like the
head of a man connected to the body of a horse, or isolated pieces, such as an eye or
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an ear; but, says Berkeley we cannot, for example, separate the idea of a movement
from that of a moving body, and we cannot, thus, form the distinct idea of abstract
ideas such as that of "movement." It is this very distinction based on the possibility or
impossibility of separation which Husserl has in mind with his distinction of dependent
and independent parts. Here we are dealing with a distinction in the field of the
phenomenology of inner experience, and thus Husserl speaks in this context of
"contents," the term he regularly uses to refer to parts as constituents of experience,
this being a special case of the wider, objective sense of "parts." Anyway, the
distinction is exhibited in "contents" as well as elsewhere, and thus Husserl freely
indicates that the distinction is operative here in Berkeley's polemic with Locke, and
thus this is a suitable example. And, Husserl bases his first systematic statement of
the distinction by reference to the sort of reflection on separability applied by Berkeley
to prove the impossibility of abstract ide~. Husserl says: "We have independent
contents wherever the elements of a presentational complex (complex of contents) by
their very nature perm it their separated presentation; we have dependent contents
where this is not the case."ss
We will not explore Husserl's account of the dispute between Berkeley and
Locke, which, in any case, is more fully treated in the Second Investigation. We may
simply note that Husserl points out that, for Berkeley, to be is to be perceived and that
it is the inability of abstract ideas, or ideas of inseparable qualities, to be separately
presented that Berkeley takes as the basis for denying their existence. What is
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important here is rather Husserl's contemplation on this inseparability of certain parts
of presentations. This inseparability is an a priori impossibility, an a priori necessity
in the very nature of objects. That the property of inseparability should belong to the
objects themselves, and not be merely a peculiarity of the human imagination, accords
with a principle often repeated by Husser-I, and which he also expresses at least once
in the Third Investigation: "What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be,
cannot be thought."
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Perhaps Husserl chooses Stumpt's work as his point of departure on account
of Stumpfs recognition of two distinct types of content, or for what Husserl regard's as
a felicitous nomenclature in "dependent" and "independent contents," or perhaps
because of Stumpfs consideration of systematic variations in the examples to mark out
the parameters of the distinction. In any case, the description of Berkeley's polemic as
one "in the psychological realm" and "in the field of the phenomenology of inner
experience" indicates a certain priority of Stumpfs thematization of the problem,
which is then applied back to interpret Berkeley's argument on "abstract ideas."
Examples selected from Stumpf are, e.g., the relation of visual quality to
extension, and "the relation of both to the figure which bounds them." If we imagine

a colored surface, it is possible to vary the color at will while leaving the surface's
extension unchanged, or to vary the shape or extension of the surface while leaving
the color unchanged. This indicates a certain distinctness of color and surface; they
are clearly different constituents of the object. In fact, they appear to be independently
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variable with respect to last differences. A certain square surface of a certain size can
have its color changed while all else stays the same, but it must have some color, or it
simply cannot be. It is a law of existence, that a surface, at least a visual surface,
must have one color or another, just as a. color can only exist as qualifying some
surface. Thus, color and surface are mutually dependent parts, i.e., must always
appear in association.
Independent parts are those that can be separated. Husserl also calls them
pieces (Stucke). Husserl describes this as what one usually means in ordinary dis-

course by "parts." Pieces are the sort of thing one could break loose and consider
completely dissociated from what they are broken loose from, as we might consider
the handle broken from a dropped cup. Among pieces we might include bits.fragments, segments, divisions, sections, portions, slices, rations, shares, chunks and
smithereens. They are the sort of parts which compose piles, heaps, bunches and the

like. The breadth of our common concern with rationalizing pieces is matched by a
similar wealth of terms for designating them. Moreover, this preference for pieces
over moments is somewhat reflected in the philosophical tradition, as will be seen in
what follows.

It is important that we not give a merely linguistic or nominalistic interpretation in assigning the characteriz.ations dependent or independent to parts. Peter
Simons seems to make this mistake, as when he illustrates "essential dependence" as
follows: "it is essential to men that they possess brains, or tables that they possess
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tops." 57 What Simons means here by "essential" is really only that we wouldn't call,
say, an object without a top a "table" or an object without a brain a "man." And this is
characteristic of his work throughout, tha~ he tests for the essentiality of characteristics
by the linguistic test of whether we would assert to the truth of a proposition predicating "man," "table," etc. of objects under certain variations of their characteristics. This
is not really in accord with what Husserl means by calling something essential. That
brains may be taken as pieces (independent parts) of men, or table-tops taken as pieces
of tables should be obvious from one of Husserl's own prime examples of independence of parts: "The head of a horse can be presented 'on its own' or 'cut off, i.e.
we can hold it in our fancy, while we allow the other parts of the horse, and its whole
intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will."
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Further, Husserl also says, "every

phenomenal thing and piece of a thing is separably presentable." 59

It may be that Husserl's formulations are vague in certain respects, i.e., that it
isn't always clear how he would answer problems formulated by more recent researchers into part/whole relations. If a table-top is removed from a table, it seems we
would not want still to call the remnant a "table." It may not even be recognizable as
the bottom part of a table to someone who does not know the history of this remnant.
Clearly horses who have lost their heads have undergone some radical transformation
in their status as entities, as, surely, have their former heads. The situation becomes
57
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even more complex as we consider parts of machinery, or things picked out and made
to work ad hoc as pieces of machinery, when perhaps they were never intended for the
functional assignment given them as parts of machines, e.g., as one might use a shoe
as a doorstop.
However, it appears that Husserl, at least for the most part, has a more
fundamental type of "dependence" in mind. A table-top may no longer be a table-top,
once it is removed from a table, especially if its former function as table-top is disguised or effaced by some new assignment. Nonetheless, it is possible to remove a
table-top and still have something, in a way that it is not possible to remove a texture,
a color, or extension from the table, or its top, and still have something. A texture
that is not the texture of anything is simply an incomplete entity, i.e., something that
cannot actually be at all, unless something is added to fill it out as a possible object.
We may think about a color or texture in isolation from any object of which it is the
color or texture. This is demonstrated in the Second Investigation. To deny this is to
adopt the position Husserl attributes to Berkeley, which denies the possibility of
abstract ideas. But this is not to say that "abstract parts," another name Husserl uses
for "dependent parts," can have any objective existence without something additional,
or a supplement.
Husserl still provides the resources for the analysis of various sorts of complexity in the composition of wholes according to the style of formal law involved.
Some of these laws clearly imply a variety of dependence relations, such as causal,
temporal, natural or functional dependence, though the Investigation hardly gives more
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than a vague sketch of how one would proceed in working out a typology of the
combinatory laws that would regulate the various types of possible dependence.
Husserl appears less concerned about uncovering the varieties of such laws and
relations than with delivering certain conceptual distinctions along which such a
typology, or a clarification of dependence itself could find adequate description.
We will now examine in what ways Husserl's theory supplies the conceptual
resources for uncovering this variety in part/whole relations and forms of complexity
possible in the composition of objects.

2.3. The Multiplicity of Part/Whole Fonns; Unity & Foundation

The distinction which Husserl draws between dependent and independent
parts is the most fundamental for the Third Investigation, and Husserl gives several
formulations of it throughout the Investigation. However, this is only the starting
point for a rich array of formal types which his theory develops the concepts for
distinguishing.
The Third Investigation gives numerous definitions of dependent and independent parts. This is the fundamental distinction Husserl wishes to develop in the Third
Investigation. However, he clearly envisages, that although the question of dependence of parts on wholes or other parts is pervasive, if not always pertinent to
whole/part analyses, there are also many finer distinctions to be accounted for in the
composition of complex objects.
In comparing the relations among the parts of different wholes, or even among
the parts of one and the same whole, we come upon striking differences, on
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which our common talk of different sorts of wholes and parts is founded. A
hand, e.g., forms part of a person in quite a different way from the colour of his
hand, from his body's total extent, from his mental acts, and from the internal
'moments' of such phenomena. The parts of the extension are otherwise united
with each other than they are united with their colours etc.60
Husserl in no way approaches constructing a complete typology of part/whole forms or
relations. He puts a number of tools at our disposal for describing and analyzing
various sorts of part/whole relations, though it is obvious that these are only part of
what would be called for in a completely formalized theory.
This is consistent with his limited objectives for the Third Investigation. The
point here is above all to deliver a clear account of a few key concepts, whose
leverage is needed in the course of what js a clarificatory study of knowledge, or a
Wissenschaftslehre. Secondly, Husserl is drawing attention to a whole field of formal

reflections which have not adequately been considered in the tradition. Remarkable
categorial properties of objects are evident in the styles of partiality and composition
discernible in them, and these exhibit remarkable differences, which are essential, a
priori, and hardly accounted for by the tradition of logic. And, finally, the Third

Investigation is itself a first approach, or rough sketch of an approach to a complete
formal (axiomatic) theory of part/whole relations of the sort he advocates.
Husserl's presentation of various part/whole relations is facilitated by his
introduction of the concept of foundation, which he formally defines as follows:
If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more
comprehensive unity which associates it with an M, we say that an A as such
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requires foundation by an Mor also that an A as such needs to be supplemented
by an M.61

This makes possible some convenient ways of formulating relations which otherwise
could be expressed in terms of relations of dependence, though with more complexity
and difficulty. It will also serve later in LI towards the analysis of acts.
Foundational relations can be one-sided or reciprocal. The relation between
color and extension, for example, is reciprocal, as both are required for the presence of
either. On the other hand, the character of being a judgment is one-sidedly founded
on underlying presentations. That is, a state-of-affairs can be present without a
judgment relating to it, but judgments always require a foundation in something that is
judged.
Foundations can be mediate or immediate, in that a founded object can found
something still further. Husserl does not give the clearest examples respecting this
relation. However, we can imagine that a certain light A is perceived to be brighter
than another light B, and that a C is perceived to be brighter than a D. Here we have

pair-wise relations founded on the perceptions of individual lights, and these relations
themselves can then enter into founding a higher relation in the judgment that the
difference in brightness between A and B is greater than the difference in brightness
between C and D.

The distinction between mediate and immediate foundations, further, allows
for the formal description of parts of parts. This simple addition to Husserl's descrip-
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tive concepts enormously enhances the variability of describable structures. Mediate
parts can be ranked on a scale of remoteness (or proximity) from the wholes on which
they are mediately founded. Remarkable structural differences in the complexity of
wholes become evident through examining the ways in which these proximities are ordered, which may vary from level to level, according to pure formal laws grounded in
the essences of the elements combined. One of the most interesting things Husserl
shows is how certain properties of objects appear only at specific levels of remoteness
from their foundations, or certain levels of the whole in question.
It is possible to dispense with the notion of wholes altogether, and for it

substitute a description of the simple relations between the parts comprising it. And
Husserl considers this a perfectly equivalent formulation. By means of the notion of
foundation, simply construed as the dependence of contents on certain others, Husserl
formulates what he calls "the pregnant concept of Whole:
By a Whole we understand a range of contents which are all covered by a single
foundation without the help of further contents. The contents of such a range we
call its parts. Talk of the singleness or the foundation implies that every content
is foundationally connected, whether directly of indirectly, with every other.62
That "direct" and "indirect" foundational connections are provided for is a reference to
the possibilities of mediate and immediate foundations. This allows "single foundations" to be the basis of structured wholes of the greatest complexity. It allows for
complex hierarchies of parts which are combined to found other parts, which found
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further parts, and so on. Moreover, this is further complicated by the fact that the
modes of foundation at each level may, though need not, differ specifically.

It is significant that in the passage cited here the phrase "range of contents
which are all covered [umspannt] 63 by a single foundation" is ambiguous, depending
on the type of whole involved in the foundation. The parts, Husserl says, can all be
founded on one another (mediately or immediately), or they can all serve together to
found a new content. In the latter case, parts which are 'mutually external', or
relatively independent from one another, "serve to found new contents as their 'combinatory forms' ." 64 These "new contents" are the combinatory forms under which
pieces are connected to form wholes. These combinatory forms may correspond to
what Husserl elsewhere calls "figural moments," such as an avenue of trees, a flock of
birds, or a flight of ducks; to which we might add the pile, the assemblage, or any
other sensuously apparent unities. In these examples, the contents, independent in
themselves, together found a new content. However, Husserl seems to be especially
thinking of what he call extended wholes in this context, as he says, "Only if the
whole is an extended whole, and in general one that can be broken down into 'pieces',
are such moments obvious and indispensable a priori." 65 We will return below to the
definition of "extended wholes." Here we wish to merely clarify the two possibilities
of (1) wholes arising purely from parts founded on one another and (2) wholes
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involving the foundation of a new content, a "moment of unity," which is founded on
the parts it spans.
To support the thesis that not all wholes require peculiar moments of unity,
Husserl offers some examples and arguments. For example, he argues, "it is vain to
look in the unity of the visual phenomenon for special form-contents . . . which will
bring together non-independent 'moments' such as color and extension." 66 That neither
of these can exist without the other is sufficient to account for their unity. Indeed, if
we assume that the unity of any two moments requires a third moment, a moment of
unity, this leads to an infinite regress. If any contents A and B must have a third
content U to unite them, then there will also have to be moments U 1 and U2 to unite U
to A and B respectively, and so on infinitum. That is, if unity is possible only on the
condition that a new moment, the moment of unity, is added to the parts united, then
what is to unite these new moments, the moments of unity, to the wholes in which
they serve as such moments, if there are not endlessly new moments engendered? It is
obvious that there must come a point where we recognize that some parts are simply
united, without the addition of a new "m9ment of unity." This shows that it is not
necessary to always engender unity through a moment in addition to what is united.

Husserl anticipates a certain resistance that some might feel at the proposal
that it is possible to combine parts without there being a 'moment' of combination:
"[C]ould contents in such a situation be side by side in complete isolation, dependent
on each other for their existence and yet entirely uncombined, without their 'founda-
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tion' amounting to a connected unity in the manner here supposed?"67 The objection,
he argues, assumes that what is at issue are always relatively independent parts, parts
isolated from each other, parts which are side by side:
The picture of side by side existence is revealing .... What recommends such an
unsuitable picture-unsuitable since it tries to illustrate sensuous formlessness by
a case of sensuous form-is the mutual indifference of the contents merely given
together in space.68
What is explained here is a certain obstacle in the way of understanding a certain form
of combination, a certain relation of parts to parts, and a certain way of uniting
elements into wholes. That obstacle is the common habit of always thinking of
part/whole relations as those depicted in the sensuous form of side by side existence.
Husserl will often appeal in later Investigations to the inappropriateness of this
conception to various wholes he describes; this is the leverage of his refinements
attained here. Heidegger will often repeat this, as we will see, even to the point of
repeating key phrases, such as "side by side," in describing how Dasein is not in the
world, how knowing relates to the world and the things in it, and even how innerworldly entities are founded in a certain relation to the world. It is always thought
necessary to overcome the resistance to certain conceptions of wholes, which resistance is based on a faulty attempt to understand the whole at issue in terms of this
inappropriate picture of side by side, sensuously formed contents.
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2.4. Extended Wholes
As mentioned above, a special role is played by what Husserl calls "extended

wholes." When Husserl speaks of independent parts, or wholes which can be broken
up into pieces, he usually seems to have extended wholes in mind. However, there
seems to still be some room for wholes which are composed of independent parts,
which are not extended wholes; at least, Husserl does not seem to rule this out at any
point, even though he never clearly says whether under his conception this is possible
or not. For example, when he says with respect to "moments of unity," that "[o]nly if
the whole is an extended whole, and in general one that can be broken down into
'pieces', are such moments obvious and indispensable a priori," the direction expressed
in the conditional ("only if') would indicate only that extended wholes always need
moments of unity, while leaving unsaid whether this relation is symmetrical, i.e.,
whether wholes having moments of unity are always extended wholes. It is probably
prudent to assume that Husserl has in mind the widest possible variation in part/whole
relations and types, even where it is hard to find exemplars. We may simply say, for
now, that extended parts are always pieces, and leave open the question of whether the
converse also holds, i.e., pieces always are extended parts.
Husserl gives us a strict formal definition of extended wholes and extended
parts, as well as some subsidiary definitions of the terms he uses in the definition of
extended wholes and parts:
When a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially belong
to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole, we speak of
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it as an extended whole [extensives Ganzes], and of its pieces as extended parts
[extensive Tei/e]. 69
He also says precisely what he means by a "piecing":
The division of a whole into a plurality of mutually exclusive pieces we call a
piecing (Ze-rstiickung) of the same.''. 70
And he explicitly defines what is meant by "exclusive" pieces:
Pieces that have no piece identically in common are called exclusive (disjoined)
pieces. 71
Exclusive pieces may still have a moment in common, in that disjoint pieces may still
share a common border. Thus, Husserl defines isolated pieces:
Pieces are said to be isolated when they are disjoined in the strict sense, when
they therefore also have no identical 'moments'. 12
The definition of extended wholes plainly covers the sort of whole described
above as involving the "picture of side by side existence," or as involving "the mutual
indifference of the contents merely given together in space." This is the kind of
relation one usually has in mind when thinking of parts and wholes. It corresponds to
all sorts of wholes that can be broken into extensively measured pieces. It might be
some material substance that is ordinarily divided, maybe a solid or fluid. Each part
of such a whole belongs to "the same lowest genus as is determined the undivided
whole." That is, each of the four cups in a gallon of water will itself belong to the
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genus "water." It will not matter which cup of it one gets, as long as it really is the
same water, the same stuff as in each of the other cups, as long as it is a portion of
the same substance. Moreover, there is an indifference of each of the portions to the
others; one portion can be changed or removed in complete indifference to the others.
This is obviously, ordinarily and historically an important way of conceptualizing parts and wholes. It is involved in all sorts of exchanges. And the systematic
place for its theoretical exposition is in ordinary plane and solid geometry. Its conception and its laws are categorial. It is the type of whole involved in the ancient
Egyptian geometer's art of parceling land into comparable segments. It is involved in
all sorts of metering, as with "metered service" (say in kilowatts, where quality is
assumed uniform). It may be necessary to grade what is metered, precisely to insure
that portions of the same lowest genus (No. 2 Unleaded Gasoline, or minutes of primetime telephone connection, or as in the graded commodities of the speculative exchanges) are exchanged. As long as what is involved is portions of something all of
which belong to the same lowest genus, "all the same stuff," the parts will be related
to one another under the laws of extended wholes. If one is in possession of a
quantity of gold, it doesn't matter which particular portion it is, as, for practical
purposes, it is all the same, all pieces of the same lowest genus as is determined by
the undivided whole. The qualification "of the same lowest genus as is determined by
the whole" here guarantees that it is, for example, the gold which is divided, and not,
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say, the electrons from the protons, in case such a confusion is po~ible. Extensive
wholes are operative wherever one is dealing in parts one regards asfungible. 73
Or, we may consider extended wholes in a slightly different way, as involved
in some task to be done, where each part is just like the others. To this would
correspond, say, a job like dipping water with cups out of a large tub. It makes no
difference on which end one begins such a task, as the parts are not founded on one
another, but have the "mutual indifference of the contents merely given together in
space," are related merely under the categorial laws pertaining to "side by side existence."
It is easy to simply p~ over Husserl's statements on extended wholes as

merely defining the type of whole his theory is not about. This is, after all, the
ordinary conception of wholes, the one with which everyone is already familiar, and
about which further comment can be left to ordinary geometry courses. However, he
takes considerable care to set the concept of extended wholes in relief, to contribute
directly to our understanding of what is involved in this kind of "ordinary" whole, as
well as to clarify the distinction, in order to avoid certain sorts of fallacious reasoning.
We are warned of insisting on the nece~ity of "moments of unity" in all wholes as
reasoning from a certain "unsuitable picture-unsuitable since it tries to illustrate
sensuous formlessne~ by a case of sensuous form." This is a tendency which H~rl
repeatedly counters in the subsequent Investigations, and which Heidegger will counter
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in trying to explain such things as why Dasein is not in its world as a coat is in the
closet, as well as in his critique of Descartes' treatment of how innerworldly entities
are in the world.
There are ways in which the distinction may also prove useful in the analysis
of the traditional part/whole fallacies of composition and division. The composition
fallacy is committed by falsely reasoning that, just because the parts of some whole
have a certain property, the whole also has it. And the fallacy of division is the
converse fallacy of reasoning that the parts must have a property, on account of their
whole having that property. The fallacy is regarded as "informal," on account of the
fact that though it is often fallacious to reason from part to whole, or whole to part in
this way, it is sometimes quite reasonable. The difference is well illustrated in
Hurley's A Concise Introduction to Logic.14 As examples of reasoning from part to
whole, Hurley offers these, where I've assigned the legitimate cases to the even
numbered examples and the fallacious cases to the odd numbered:
(1)

Each atom in this piece of chalk is invisible. Therefore, the chalk is
invisible.

(2)

Every atom in this piece of chalk has mass. Therefore, the piece of chalk
has mass.

(3)

Sodium and chlorine, the atomic components of salt, are both deadly
poisons. Therefore, salt is a deadly poison.

(4)

Every picket in this picket fence is white. Therefore, the whole fence is
white.
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Again, numbering the fallacies odd and the non-fallacies even, Hurley offers the
following examples of the converse procedure of reasoning from whole to part:
(5)

This jigsaw puzzle, when assembled, is circular in shape. Therefore, each
piece is circular in shape.

(6)

This piece of chalk has mass. Therefore, the individual atoms that compose this piece of chalk have mass.

(7)

Salt is a nonpoisonous compound. Therefore, its component elements,
sodium and chlorine, are nonpoisonous.

(8)

This field of poppies is uniformly orange in color. Therefore, the individual poppies are orange in color.

Hurley explains that the fallacies of composition and division are normally classed as
informal because it cannot be determined_ from a mere inspection of form whether an

attribute can be transferred from parts to whole, or from a whole to its parts. Hurley
also says that detecting the fallacies "requires a general knowledge of the situation and
of the nature of the attribute being transferred." 75 I have quoted the examples at length
to show that, at least for these and similar examples, Husserl's definition of extended
wholes serves as an adequate criterion for determining whether an attribute is transferable.
Each of the even numbered cases here is a case of reasoning from an extended whole to its pieces, or of reasoning to an extended whole from its pieces. Moreover, I have unable to find or think of any examples that violate the criterion. Or,
perhaps the formula ought to be expressed the other way around, that if it is fallacious
to transfer a property from part to whole, or conversely, then we are not discussing an
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extended whole; and if it is not fallacious, then we are discussing and extended whole.
What is at issue is whether "a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces
essentially belong to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole";
if it does, then, if we reason to the transference of property between parts and whole,
then we do not commit the fallacies of composition and division; and if the whole
does not permit this sort of piecing, then we will commit these fallacies by such a
transference the property.
Let's consider the easy cases first. An extent of uniform color obviously is
the sort of thing that permits the sort of piecing in question in the definition of
extended wholes and parts; and therefore (4) and (8) are valid. The color at issue is a
dependent part of the extension it covers. However, the extents in question are
independent of one another, merely side-by-side, present together in space and indifferent to one another. The mutual dependence of the moments of color and extent
involved in the piecing merely implies that the fragmentation of the one is exactly
correlative to the other, and the pieces on one side stand in the same relation to each
other as the pieces on the other side. Husserl describes exactly this sort of piecing:
the fragmentation of a non-independent 'moment' conditions a fragmentation of
the concrete whole, in so far as the mutually exclusive 'pieces~ without themselves entering into afoundationa/ relation with one another, attract new 'moments' to themselves in virtue of which they are singly distributed to the 'pieces'
of the whole. 76

The fragmentation of a white picket fence into the white pickets that make it up, and
the fragmentation of an orange poppy field into the orange poppies that make it up,
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can only be done on the basis of this mutual conditioning of fragments of an extent
and color, where the pieces of one are distributed exactly on the pattern of the other
moment's pieces.
A similar logic is followed in examples (2) and (6). Mass is an addable
attribute, just as extension is. Mass is added and subtracted piece-wise to or from a
total mass. The piecing of a chunk of gold, for example, will condition a piecing of
the chunk's value, as the quantity of the chunk's value is precisely dependent on the
quantity of the chunk's mass. This is, of course, part of how the extensive properties
of money arise, as well as the values of everything measured in money. It, of course,
corresponds to the extensive valuation of other regular and ordinary commodities that
are traded in extensive portions.
In examples (3) and (7) the wholes, which are a chemical compound (Salt)
belong explicitly to a different genus from the parts (atomic components, or elements).
Therefore, there is no piecing of the whole out of parts belonging to the same last
genus as the undivided whole involved here.
Examples (5) and (1) should be interpreted in the light of Husserl's discussion
of parts nearer and farther from the whole, where he specifically discusses the moment
of shape. He says there is an
essential formal distinction between such 'moments' as can only satisfy their
need for supplementation in the complete whole, and such as can satisfy this
need in pieces of this whole. This ,nakes a difference to the mode of belonging,
to the form of foundation: by it certain parts, e.g. the total extent of the intuited
thing, belong exclusively to the thing as a whole, while other parts, e.g. the
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extent of a 'piece', belong specifically to this 'piece', and only remotely to the
whole. 77
Therefore, in example (5), the fact that the property of being circular in shape would
belong to the whole jigsaw puzzle is no grounds for inferring that its pieces are
circular. Similarly, in example (1) the visibility of the whole is founded on it as a
whole. If we regard The Visible, as a genus of the whole, and regard The Invisible as
a genus of all the atoms that are part of this whole, then clearly the whole is not in
this respect divisible into pieces belonging to the same lowest genus as does the
whole. This reasoning is of course a reversal of our application of the formula. That
is, rather than using the definition as a predictor that a fallacy will or will not ensue
from part/whole reasoning, we are using the obvious fallaciousness of composition or
division in this instance to show that the wholes in question are not extended with
respect to the properties in question. But this should suffice to show that the formula
still at least works as a definition. Whatever the formula indicates is an extended
whole and parts will be of the same whole/part type as permits a reasoning from one's
having the attribute to the other's having it; and whatever the formula indicates is not
of an extended whole/part type become involved in a fallacy (either of composition or
division) if there is a resoning from its parts to its whole or whole to parts.
It would require more research than is possible here to elevate what is offered
here as an hypothesis to a reliable general principle. However, in a fully formalized
part/whole theory of the type envisaged by Husserl, it may be possible through Hus-
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serl's definitions to formalize a criterion for determining when composition or division
is fallacious and when it isn't. As this would tum one of the main traditional informal
fallacies into aformal fallacy, that would surely be no small gain for logic. This
would require, I think, a formalization based on a closer reading and interpretation of
the whole Third Investigation than what has been rendered to date, where efforts have
concentrated on the six propositions of Section 14.
Husserl is in no way arguing in the Third Investigation to replace the "ordinary conception" of parts and wholes, as is evident in the care he takes to define the
essence of the type of relation involved in extended wholes. However, the ordinary
conception is misapplied in many contexts, where its application actually produces a
sort of fallacious reasoning. In this aspect, Husserl is up to a very traditional sort of
logical research in LI. LI is concerned primarily with a certain descriptive phase,
uncovering some fundamental descriptive distinctions, much as the most radical of
logicians, Aristotle, set out such distinctions as that between contradictories and
contraries, or evidential and causal reasons. The detailed elaboration and exposition of
logic depends on this previous phase of discovery, i.e., on a prolegomena to logic.
Thus, Husserl only gives a rough, preliminary sketch of the sort of propositions which
would belong to a formal exposition, though he goes to considerable length to make
the fundamental distinctions clear. In the course of this, it is important to set the
concept of extended wholes in sharp relief, in order to clearly show what the concept
is, as well as what it isn't.
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2.5. Independent and Dependent Meanings

Where the Third Investigation illustrates what is meant by dependent parts
primarily through sensuous examples, following the psychological researches of
Stumpf, and similarly minded contemporaries, the whole of the Fourth Investigation is
taken up with illustrating an application of the theory to the field of meaning and its
linguistic expression. The Fourth Investigation provides an important bridge to the
studies of the Fifth and Sixth Investigations, on intentional experiences and on the
clarification of knowledge. Meanings are correlated to acts of meaning; or, as Husserl
says in the Introduction to the Fifth Investigation, "to meanings in specie correspond
acts of meaning, the former being nothing but ideally apprehended aspects of the
latter." 78 Moreover, as he says in the Introduction to the Sixth Investigation, "All
thought, and in particular all theoretical thought and knowledge, is carried on by way
of certain 'acts', which occur in a context of expressive discourse." 79 The Fourth
Investigation, "The Distinction between Independent and Non-Independent Meanings
and the Idea of Pure Grammar," serves not only to illustrate an application of the
part/whole theory of the Third Investigation, but to carry the pertinence of its analyses
forward into themes of the Fifth and Sixth Investigations. It is particularly important
to us here, as it serves as a primary illustration of the dependence of parts on wholes
or other parts, i.e., as a counterbalance to the previous discussion of extended parts.
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Husserl begins the Investigation in a manner parallel to that of the Third, by
showing how meanings are divisible into simple and complex. An expression is
complex if it contains parts which themselves have meanings; it is simple otherwise.
Moreover, the meanings contained as parts of a complex meaning may themselves
have further meanings as parts of themselves, and so on indefinitely. However, at
some point division must come to an end, where simple meanings come to the fore.
And the possibility of simple meanings Husserl illustrates by the "the undubitable case
of something."

80

WhatHusserl has in mind here is fairly obvious. We discover in expressions
parts which are themselves expressions, words in phrases, phrases in sentences, etc.
However, several significant distinctions are operative in his analysis. In the first
place, there is the application of the formal distinctions which were developed as a
part of the pure theory of parts and wholes in the Third Investigation. Secondly, the
application of the theory to expression and meaning is seen to turn into a many-sided
analysis. The articulation of ( 1) the sensuous elements of language (e.g., the complex
of sounds in spoken discourse) does not correspond to the division of (2) meanings
expressed in expressions. Moreover, neither the complexity of the meaning nor of the
sensuous element is in any way parallel to the complexity of (3) the objects intended
or meant in expressions. The demonstrated lack of parallelism respecting these three
domains indicates that indeed we are dealing with distinct and irreducible parts of
experiences of meaning. The distinctions drawn here by, and for the sake of applying,
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the part/whole theory play an increasingly important role in accounting in the Sixth
Investigation for the objectivity of knowledge. Let us note the differences.
First, Husserl says that no one would count the German word "Konig" as a
complex expression, merely because of its consisting of more than one syllable. To
count as complex an expression must consists of parts which are meaningful. Syllables are for the most part like letters, with some simple meanings formed through
combinations of them merely as a convenient way to supply a language with more
simple expressions than would be possible if all simple meanings were expressed
monosyllabically. The difference can be seen by considering how the incompleteness
of meaningful parts of complex expressions differs from the incompleteness of
sensuous parts of a word.
To a conjunction like 'but', or to a genitive like 'father's', we can significantly
attribute a meaning, but not to a verbal fragment like 'fu'. Both come before us
as needing completion, but their needs of completion differ essentially.... In
the successive formation of a complex verbal structure its total meaning gets
built up, in the successive formation of a word, the word alone gets built up;
only when the word is completed does it house the fleeting thought.81
There are, of course, questionable cases respecting whether words contain parts, as in
the cases of prefixes and suffixes, or of the components of compound words. But,
Husserl argues, for the most part these are not functioning a "parts of an expression
qua expression," are "not its significant parts," but only "parts of the expression as a

sensuous phenomenon." 82
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Second, the partiality of expressions does not parallel the partiality of objects.
The notion that this would be the case arises from the error of thinking that a meaning
has the character of picturing an object. If meaning pictured its objects, then the
complexity of expressions might map part-wise the complexity of the expressions'
objects. Husserl has already rejected this. sort of side-by-side image as appropriate for
capturing certain kinds of part/whole relations, and he explicitly rejects it here as
appropriate for capturing the relation of expressions to their objects. The inadequacy
of the notion is shown by counterexample.
The very expression "non-independent moment" provides a decisive counterexample. It is a categorematic expression and yet presents a non-independent
object. Every non-independent object whatever can be made the object of an
independent meaning, and that directly, e.g. Redness, Figure, Likeness, Size,
Unity, Being. 83
That is, we can talk of the size of something, where "size" is not a partial meaning,
not syncategorematic, while it is plain that size itself can only exist as the size of
something. In fact, any object, any dependent or independent part, whether concrete
or abstract, whatever can be made the object of a categorematic expression, i. e., the
object of an independent meaning.
Moreover, the simplicity of meanings may not correspond to the simplicity of
obje<;ts. It is common to use a simple expression, such as a proper name, to refer to
an object which is complex. Husserl argues for a separation of the complexity of the
object from the complexity of an expression referring to it. When, for example, I use
the name "Schultze," I mean him simply, and not a list of properties that I might
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associate with the man Schultze. Any or, perhaps, all of the particulars I think of
when I mention Schultze can change, or someone else may associate a completely
different set of particulars with the expression "Schultze" at the very moment I use it,
and yet Schultze would still mean the sat?e man. However, in any presentation of
Schultze in association with the name "Schultze" there will be some complex determination of the referents; and that there should be one such complex determination or
another may well be what is meant by an expression, though this is meant with a
certain indefiniteness as to exactly how the referent may be presented. An expression
may mean its object with a certain indefiniteness as to its possible presentations.
Thus, Husserl draws an essential distinction, which again serves to found a split
between the part/whole analysis of expressions from the part/whole analysis of the
objects referred to in them, which he describes as:
... the distinction between concrete, meaning-conferring experiences, which are
complex or simple as regards their meaning conceived purely as meaning, and
such experiences as are complex oi simple only in a secondary respect, through
the presentative content through which one is conscious of the object meant.84
What we have seen is that the combination of meanings into complex or
compound meanings corresponds neither to the complexity of the objects meant nor to
the complexity of the sensuous element of expressions (e.g., speech, writing). Yet it is
obvious that not just any meanings can be combined with any others. There are pure,
apriori laws, Husserl argues, for the combination of meanings into new meanings. The
grammars of the various natural languages give diverse possibilities for symbolizing
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the distinguishable meaning-forms, yet they are all constrained by the necessity to
make sense according to what is possible apriori.
What is fundamental is the act of meaning; it pervades both expression and
intended objects. The act of meaning is not itself meant, unless by a second act of
reflection. It presents its referent, but is not itself presented in itself. This is essentially the structure of intentionality, which is the primary concern of the Fifth Investigation, where intentionality is explored in relation to the contents of consciousness.

In

contrast to a common sort of sense-data theory of experience, Husserl maintains that
what appears is distinct from what presents it.
... truly immanent contents, which belong to the real make-up (reelen Bestande)
of the intentional experiences, are not intentional: they constitute the act,
provide the necessary points d'appui, which render possible an intention, but are
not themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act. I do not see
colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the
singer's song etc. etc.85
"Points d'appui," "A nhaltspunkte": intentionality is always founded on something not

intended but experienced, always founded on something which is non-thematic, but
which serves as presentative of the actually minded objects intended. Objects are
meant, not merely presented blindly; they are recognized in perceptions, imaginings,

thoughts, etc., as objects. And, all of this is to say that meaning pervades intentional
experiences generally.
The essence of expression is to convey a meaning. Expression originates to
fulfill a communicative function (I-7), though they continue to serve meaning-confer-
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ring acts even in soliloquy (1-8). Whatever unities of sense can be experienced,
whatever can be the object of intentional experience, can be conveyed in expression.
The same principles of identifying or nullifying synthesis which are generally operative in an objectifying consciousness are also operative in the regulation of what can
be expressed. Yet, this does not conflate expressions with objects presented in them.
An expression's meaning, as was said above, is in specie nothing but an ideally

apprehended aspect of the acts of meaning. Meaning arises through an idealizing
abstraction of a sameness from context to context.
However, the possibilities of unity of meaning are not equivalent to the
possibilities of objective fulfillment or intuition of actual objects. Thus, Husserl
distinguishes "laws which discourage nonsense" from "laws which discourage absurdity." It is possible to mean things which are objectively (even apriori) impossible. The
expression "round square" has a meaning, even though what it expresses is impossible
by its very essence, impossible precisely because of what the expression means.
Meanings appear to have their own irreducible essence in Husserl's philosophy, as well
as their own apriori set of governing laws for combination into complex meanings,
their own laws of dependent and independent existence.
The possibilities of combining meanings are constrained by antecedently
definite laws which pertain to their essence. Syncategorematic expressions, such as
"only if," "not without," "and," "the father's" or "on the way to" call for completions
of very definite types in each case. They are dependent on larger expressions into
which they fit to acquire any definite meaning at all. They contribute a part to the
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meanings in which they are properly fitted, and this because they are essentially
partial, i.e., are essentially dependent parts of meanings that include them.
The question arises as to how a syncategorematic expression can mean
anything alone, why an expression such as "but," "equals," or "or" is not merely a
senseless noise when used out of context. Modes of combination are themselves
accessible to an idealizing abstraction, and thus we recognize and convey the partial
intentions expressed in the syncategorematica, even when they are uttered as fragments, though we also recognize the need for completion as part of their very sense.
Husserl's "dependent meanings" can be seen to be very much like Russell's "propositional functions," though the former comprise a more general class, as partial meanings
can contribute to parts of propositions, or to parts of parts of propositions.
Finally, it must be seen that the connection of parts of expressions to other
parts, or to whole expressions, differs essentially from any sort of side-by-side, or
extensive relations. This is plain from what Husserl says about the complexity of
intentional acts in the Fifth Investigation. First, an act of meaning must have a unified
correlate:
Whatever the composition of an act out of partial acts may be, if it is an act at
all, it must have a single objective correlate, to which we say it is 'directed', in
the full, primary sense of the word. 86

Secondly, we are told explicitly that the part acts are not related in a side-by-side
fashion to the whole:
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the unity of what is objectively presented, and the whole manner of the intentional reference to it, are not set up alongside of the partial acts, but in them, in
the way in which they are combined, a way which realizes a unity of act, and
not merely a unity of experience. 87
Further, Husserl gives definite descriptions of the specific mode of being in which
partial acts have to the unities founded on them:
. . . there are great differences in the energy, so to speak, with which acts assert
themselves in an act-complex. Generally the greatest energy will be displayed
by the act-character which comprehends and subsumes all partial acts in its unity.... In this act, we live, as it were, principally; in the subordinate acts only in
proportion to the importance of their achievements for the whole act and its
intention. 88
In the last quoted instance, Husserl is primarily concerned with how expressions are
involved in experiences involving them, particularly in the instance where we attend to
what is said rather than to the expression in which it said, i.e., where an expression is
part of a total complex experience involving perhaps a perception or other relevant
involvement in what is meant. Nonetheless, it is in this sort of complex unity that
expressions themselves are brought to unity in intentional experiences. "All perceiving
and imagining is, on our view, a web of partial intentions, fused together in the unity
of a single total intention." 89
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Es wird auch eine weitere Beobachtung illustrieren, die hier niemandem
entgehen kann, niimlich daB sozusagen hi_nsichtlich der Aktivitat, mit welcher sich
Akte einer Komplexion geltend machen, sehr erhebliche Unterschiede moglich sind.
Normalerweise wird der Aktcharakter, der die Einheit aller Teilakte umspannt, sie alle
unter sich hat . . . die grosste Aktivitat entfalten. In diesem Akte leben wir vorzugsweise, in den untergeordneten Akten aber nur nach MaBgabe der Bedeutsamkeit ihrer
Leistung fiir den Gesamtakt und seine Intention. (LU, II/I, 405b; LI, 582).
89
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Thus, part/whole relations, through their involvement in the constitution of
meaning, are a pervasive aspect of conscious experiences of all kinds and at every
level. And it is through the analysis of dependent and independent meanings in the
Fourth Investigation that Husserl prepares the ground for applying the pure part/whole
theory of the Third Investigation to the far reaching problems of intentional experience
and the phenomenology of knowledge in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations. It is
important to see this operative relation to understand the significance of the Third
Investigation to the whole project of Logical Investigations. It is especially important
to understanding why the "investigations''. of LI are called "logical." While Husserl
says the we are not engaged in a systematic exposition of logic in LI, but a prolegomena to any future such exposition, it is plain that he intends to primarily advance
logical theses in this work, and the part/whole theory, often considered little more than
incidental to the main tasks of the work, is perhaps the most formally advanced of
logical theses in the work. The themes of intentionality, signification, consciousness,
objectivity, etc., which are usually considered most central to LI can be interpreted as
motivating; i.e., Husserl perceives an inadequacy of understanding of these matters,
which is largely based on inadequate doctrines of logic, and it is primarily this logic
which he wishes to set straight, if only because its inadequacy to epistemology has
been shown in the perplexities based on it.
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2.6. The Ideality of Part/Whole Relations and
the Categorial Intuition of their Forms
A whole, in Husserl's sense, is more than a mere aggregate. An aggregate is
a categorial unity corresponding to the mere form of thought, "it stands for the
correlate of a certain unity of reference relating to all relevant objects." 90 That is,
while it is possible to define collections of any entities we like, however disparate or
separate, and such collections are governed by their own pertinent categorial forms,
there is always something more to the composition of wholes. But, this extra in the
composition of wholes is not itself a further part, less we fall into an infinite regress,
as discussed above (section 3). A whole always depends for its unity on relations of
foundation, and these relations are always governed essentially by the kinds of parts
involved. Husserl explicitly locates the governing principle in the parts, rather than in
the wholes, it belonging to the essence of parts to be the parts of just certain formally
definite types of wholes. It pertains to the "generic essence" of parts, by "laws of
essence," which are apriori, that they can only enter into certain formally definite types
of wholes, and this according to certain formally definite types of foundational
relations.
Husserl distinguishes "material," or "synthetic," laws from "formal," or
"analytic" laws. The distinction is applied to part/whole relations in the problematic
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context of the possibility of a pure formal theory of parts and wholes. In

m, § 11

the

difference in analytic and synthetic propositions is explained by way of illustration:
It is now immediately plain, that all the laws or necessities governing
different sorts of non-independent items fall into the spheres of the synthetic a
priori: one grasps completely what divides them from merely formal, contentless
items. Laws of the type of the causal principle . . . or the laws . . . which assert
the non-independence of mere qualities, intensities, extensions, boundaries, relational forms etc. -would not be put on a level with a purely 'analytic' generalization such as 'A whole cannot exist without parts' or with analytic necessities
such as 'There cannot be a king (master, father) without subjects (servants,
children) etc.'. We may say in general: correlatives mutually entail one another. . . . If we set beside these any definite propositions of the opposite sort, e.g.,
'A colour cannot exist without something coloured' . . . the difference leaps into
view. 91

Analytic laws are those which are completely free from any dependence on the
content. Where empirical propositions are found "analytically true" ("e.g., If this

house is red, then redness pertains to this house"), it is due to the proposition's
empirically specifying an analytic law, not because of any of the content of the objects
specified. However, propositions such as that there cannot be a color without some

surface over which it is spread are true only in virtue of the sorts of content involved.
Thus, it seems, the greater part of Husserl's theory is concerned with introducing a
pure formal account of wholes whose laws are immune to a purely analytic description, or to "complete formalization," as foundational relations are dependent on the
types of content involved.
Husserl indicates the contradiction himself in §23. After having said in §22
that "[t]he only true unifying factors, we may roundly say, are relations of 'foundation',
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and that "Unity is in fact a categorial predicate," 92 he seems to run into problems with
his own efforts to use the notion of categorial form to distinguish wholes from mere
aggregates:
The form of an aggregate is a purely categorial form, in opposition to which the
form of a whole, of a unity due to foundation, appeared to be a material form.
But did we not say in the previous section that unity (and we were talking
specifically of a unity based on foundation) was a categorial predicate?93
The resolution Husserl makes of this conundrum is very important to understanding
the sense of a pure formal theory of parts and wholes, though it is easy to read over as
merely saving the consistency of a certain word usage, particularly as he often does
resolve apparent inconsistencies by merely disambiguating, or showing that a word can
have more than one sense and separately designating these senses. However, what
takes place here is that Husserl employs an extended syllogism, a sorites, which both
resolves the apparent contradiction and gives the essential form of the conditions of
the possibility of a pure theory of parts and wholes.
Here we must note that, on our doctrine, the Idea of unity or the Idea of a whole
is based on the idea of 'Founding', and the latter Idea upon the Idea of a Pure
Law; the Form of a Law is further as such categorial-a law is not thinglike, not
therefore perceptible-and that to this extent the notion of a Founded whole is a
categorial notion. 94
But how can this resolve the contradiction? If the Idea of a unity or the Idea of a
whole is based on the idea of 'Founding,' and the latter on the Idea of a Pure Law, and
the form of this is purely categorial, then aren't the analytic relations pervasive?
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Aren't, then, all part/whole relations analytic? Where is there room for the material
laws which are supposed to govern the composition of wholes with dependent contents?
The answer appears immediately in the following section, though its sense
can perhaps only be fully grasped after the expositions of the Sixth Investigation:
The pure forms of wholes and parts are determined by the pure forms of law.
Only what isformally universal in the foundational relation, as expressed in our
definition, is then relevant, together with the a priori combinations that it
permits. We rise, in the case of any type of whole, to its pure form, its categorial type, by abstracting from the specificity of the sorts of content in question .
. . In formalization we replace the names standing for the sort of content in
question by indefinite expressions such as a ce11ain son of content, a ce11ain
other son of content etc. At the same time, on the semantic side, corresponding
substitutions of purely categorial for material thoughts take place.95
What takes place is a ''formalizing abstraction," by which the forms of laws are
specified without any reference to the specific contents of the wholes from which the
forms are abstracted.
This formalization, while ignoring specific content, still leaves us with a
wealth of important relations and distinctions. "The distinctions between abstract parts
and 'pieces' are purely formal," 96 as are the distinctions between nearer and remoter
parts, of immediate and relative dependence or independence, as are the laws pertaining to the piecing of wholes through the piecing of their moments, the formal descriptive properties of concatenations, of reciprocal and one-sided foundations, of relative
and absolute concretions, simple and complex objects, etc. The material specifications
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of these formal relations are to the formal principles as are empirical specifications of
mathematical principles to those principles, or as analytic statements are to empirical
instances generally.
In the Sixth Investigation Husserl introduces the theory of categorial intuition,
and it becomes clear how we rise to what is purely formal and universal in developing
a pure theory of parts and wholes. According to Husserl, there is a special form of
intuition by which we become aware of certain non-real elements of objects and states
of affairs ("real" here having the usual sense of existing in space and time). The case
is analogous for language and perception. Just as in the case of the former we can
understand the syncategorematica, without any individual sensible parts corresponding
to them,
The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if and the 'then', the 'all' and the
'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and the determinations of number etc.-all these are meaningful propositional elements, but we
should look in vain for their objective correlates (if such may be ascribed to
them at all) in the sphere of real objects, which is in fact no other than the
sphere of objects of possible sense-perception.97
so it is also in the case of perception or sensible representation: "I can paint A and I
can paint B, and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I cannot, however, paint
the both, nor paint the A and the B ." 98 Yet, though there are plainly parts of what is
meant in speech and perception which cannot be isolated in any way from the whole
as a sensible phenomenon, Husserl rejects any recourse to a psychological explanation,
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such as that the mind brings these dependent elements with it. What is meant in each
such case is precisely something in the object or state of affairs itself. Husserl uses
the example of being: I can see color, or feel smoothness, but not see or feel being
colored or being smooth; being is something absolutely imperceptible. It is one of his

prime examples of a categorial. However, it is also the case that, say, being red is
something we know from experiencing things which are red. We experience being red
as something actually present in those things which are red, but not as a real part of
them. In fact, he argues that all intuition is based on sensuous intuition, at least as a
founding moment, though what is intuited may go beyond what is sensuous in a
sensuous presentation. Husserl finds that the only solution to the problem of how we
have knowledge of categorial elements is to admit an irreducible form of intuition
corresponding to them: "there must at least be an act which renders identical services
to the categorial elements of meaning that merely sensuous perception renders to the
material elements."99

It is important to stress that Husserl's solution is not to merely abandon the
problem. His solution depends on arguments showing both the necessity and the
possibility of categorial intuition.
First, there is the negative critique of psychological explanations of nonsensuous elements. This is the usual solution for empiricism. Since Locke, says Husserl,
what is nonsensuous has been thought to exist through the combining operations of the
mind, which are revealed to 'reflection', when we look internally at the thoughts in
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which sensuous elements are put together to give the forms of objects and states of
affairs. This, he says, really does nothing but push the problem back into another
sphere of the sensuous, into the sphere of internal sensibility. The question still
remains as to how we would perceive such connections internally. No such account,
therefore, really answers the question as to how we come to know the categorial
elements of experience. I.e., it is still necessary that categorial relations and properties
come to intuition themselves, that they be recognized as themselves; nothing is gained
by merely postponing the intuition of them to a second interior stage of 'reflective'
perception.
Second, the possibility of categorial intuition is shown through the theory of
foundational relations. All intuition depends on some sort of sensuous intuition ( either
perceptual or imaginative). These, however, are generally pervaded by signitive
intentions, for which the sensuously present elements are a point d'appui, are A nhaltspunkte, i.e., are supports for an intuition which perceives something beyond and

through them. This basic structure is repeated at numerous levels. The first gives us
ordinary objects, which are perceived in a manner which Husserl calls 'straightforward
perception.' The objects of 'straightforward perception' are not simple sensuous
properties, but the things synthesized through an already complex synthesis of 'adumbrations.' These perceptions are 'straightforward' only in distinction from the acts
which Husserl characterizes as categorial intuitions, which abstract from a given
perception or intuition to a universal element, which is only illustrated in the objects
presented by straightforward perceptions. This founded intuition is a sort of second
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sight; it constitutes a certain view or conception of objects first given in straightforward perception. This view leaves straightforward objects fundamentally unaltered,
while it is still to a certain degree free with regard to them; the same fundamental
objects can serve to illustrate numerous possible conceptions founded on them; these
latter, however, are not completely free in 'authentic' categorial intuition, as there are
essential laws regulating what kinds of connections founding contents can be involved
in.
Husserl replaces the empiricist reflection, an internal perception of perception,
with another sort of second sight. Here we see one of those strategic turns from
psychology to the things themselves. Perception of the universal is a founded perception, but not a perception of a perception. What is sighted in categorial intuition is
rather a second objectivity. Such ideas as those of relation, number, whole and part
are founded on intuitions (perceptual or imaginative) of things related under these
ideas. It is possible to then found further categorial notions on other founded notions,
and there is no theoretical limit to the possible complexity of such foundations. I may
see that A is brighter than B, and from this and similar instances form the idea of a
general relation of x being brighter than y. This can then found a higher level relation
of the sort illustrated in the judgment "The difference in brightness between A and B
is greater than the difference in brightness between C and D, thus giving way to judg-

ments of the most complex relations. As long as we can find actual fulfilling instances of the types of relations described we having authentic intuitions of them; where we
only have symbolic intuitions, merely signitive intentions toward relations whose
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foundations are not actually secured, we have inauthentic thoughts of such relations.
The categorial intuitions are not the same as the mere relational noticing, perceiving or
experiencing of things, but are the perceptions of the founded relations themselves. It
is not in the mere perception of a number of things that the category of number is
perceived, but in the thought directed to the number itself. Thus we rise from straightforward perception to founded intuitions ·of a categorial type. And it is on this
possibility that Husserl would ground a pure theory of parts and wholes.
Categorial intuitions are objective. In the case of wholes and parts, or
relations between wholes and parts, or parts and parts, there are definite laws founded
on the types of parts combined, whose form can be abstracted as the pure categorial
form of a law. These forms are ordinarily already (a priori) operative in the constitution of objects and states of affairs, as dependent (abstract) parts of these objects or
states of affairs. Obviously, explicit reflection on these abstract contents allows a
categorial reshaping of objective experience, a reconceptualization, a fresh objective
interpretation. The distinctions of the Third Investigation are only a first, tentative and
approximate statement of generalities pertaining to a pure theory of parts and wholes.
And this is largely to extract a refinement of some notions needed to work "in the
manner of a lever," in an epistemological clarification. The primary objective is to
clarify the distinction between dependent and independent parts, but it is also to call
attention to the more general fact of a multiplicity of ways of being a part.
There are indications scattered throughout the Third Investigation of some
interesting basic methodological considerations, such as the following:
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If we say, for example, that the 'moment' of sensory quality, e.g. of sensory
colour, is non-independent, and requires a whole in which it may be embodied,
we have only laid down one side of our governing law, the side of a part which
belongs to the Genus Sensory Quality. We have not, however, laid down the
character of the whole, the manner in which such a 'quality' is its part, or the
sort of supplement it needs to achieve existence. It is different when we say that
a sensory quality can only exist in a sense-field, and a sensory colour in a visual
sense-field, or that it can only exist as qualifying an extension. There the law
lays down the other sides as well; the notion of a visual sense-field is given; and
it means a particular, definite sort of whole among various possible sorts of
whole. Just so, the notion of 'qualifying an extension' points to quite specific
possibilities of law-governed inherence that a non-independent 'moment' may
have to a whole. 100
Here we are generally encouraged to be specific in the description of part/whole
relations, to state in addition to the dependence of a part (1) the character of the
whole, (2) the manner in which the part is a part of the whole and (3) the sort of
supplement the part needs to achieve existence. The general course of this methodological suggestion is worked out with respect to a sensory phenomenon. However, I
think the passage is significant in that it already raises the question of what is meant
by "being-in," of which Heidegger makes much use in Being and Time.
As has been indicated, Husserl makes much use of the general problematic

opened by the Third Investigation in the rest of LI. There has already been some
recognition in the literature of the importance of Husserl's Third Investigation to the
rest of LI. I hope I have laid the groundwork here for showing a broader significance
for the Third Investigation in the general confrontation of phenomenology with the
philosophical tradition. In particular, I intend to show in what follows how the Third
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Investigation lays the theoretical and methodological groundwork for Heidegger's
critical analysis of the prevalent modern view of the world and innerworldly things.

CHAPTER 3

HEIDEGGER: INNERWORLDLY PARTS

3.1. Heidegger & Phenomenology
Being and Time is a work of complex interests. Heidegger seems to have
spent a decade working on it (at least, he had not published anything for ten years
before its emergence), and it could perhaps be looked on as his "breakthrough"; it is at
least the work from which he emerges as a "major philosopher." There is much
insight into the formation of Heidegger's thought to be gained from reading the recently published lecture series given shortly before the completion of BT, History of the
Concept of Time, which is referred to in the "Translator's Foreword" as including "the
most sustained and specific confrontation of phenomenology in general and Husserl in
particular that we are likely to get from Heidegger. Here we find Heidegger not only
at his most phenomenological, but we c~ also see more clearly how the phenomenological problematics lead him into domains of inquiry which transcend the philosophical motivations of Husserl. There are also some fundamental insights into how
Heidegger became involved in the peculiar complex of interests expressed in BT to be
found in a short article "Mein Weg in die Phiinomenologie," which appears in Zur
Sache des Denkens. 101 We will consider the latter text first. The point here, of course,
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is to drive toward an interpretation of the method of BT, which will allow us to see
the impact of the Third Investigation on Heidegger's analysis of the world.
In "Mein Weg in die Phiinomenologie," written for the occasion of Max
Niemeyer's 80th birthday, Heidegger tells how he first became aware of Husserl's
work, as well as how he eventually came to be published by the same press which had
published Husserl's Logical Investigations. In particular, we find that the issue of
being, and, further, the meaning of being, were issues which animated Heidegger long

before any study of Husserl. Heidegger came to the study Logical Investigations
through a mistaken impression that, as Husserl had somehow been influenced by
Brentano, the work would further Heidegger's researches into issues he had approached
through Brentano's dissertation "Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach
Aristoteles" (1862). 102 His remarks are sufficiently interesting to quote at length:
Von Husserls »Logischen Untersuchungen« erwartete ich eine entscheidende
Forderung in den durch Brentanos Dissertation angeregten Fragen. Doch meine
Bemiihung war vergeblich, weil, was ich erst sehr viel spater erfahren sollte, ich
nicht in der rechten Weise suchte. ·Gleichwohl blieb ich von Husserls Werk so
betroffen, daB ich in den folgenden Jahren immer wieder darin las ohne die
zureichende Einsicht in das, was mich fesselte. Der Zauber, der von dem Werk
ausging, erstreckte sich bis auf das Au.Bere des Satzspiegels und des Titelblattes.
Auf diesem, das mir noch heute so vor Augen steht wie damals, begegnete mir
der Name des Verlags Niemeyer. Er verkniipfte sich mit dem mir fremden
Namen "»Phiinomenologie«, der im Untertitel des zweiten Bandes auftauchte. 103
Heidegger was expecting to find in LI some decisive advances on the questions raised
in Brentano's dissertation. But his efforts were in vain, because, as he would only find
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out much later, he was not seeking in the
right way. Nonetheless, he remained so
fascinated (betroffen) by Husserl's work
that in the following years he read from ~t
again and again, without any adequate insight into what it was that fascinated him.

Trademark of Max Niemeyer
Verlag, as on title-page of LI.

The spell (Zauber) which emanated from the work extended to the exterior appearances of the text and the title page. It was on this title page, which he "can see to this
day as clearly as then [das mir noch heute so vor Augen steht wie damals]," that he
first encountered the name Max Niemeyer Verlag. The name was attached to that still
strange name "phenomenology," which appeared on the title page of the second vol-

wne.
Of course, as this article was written in celebration of Max Niemeyer, one can
only surmise that Heidegger's fascination· with the way the book looked finds more
emphasis here than it might otherwise. However, it is interesting to read how opaque
Heidegger originally found LI. We see that he came to read it only because he
thought it would have something to do with Brentano's researches on the manifold
senses of "being" in Aristotle. In this regard he found it useless, though he was still
sufficiently fascinated with it to go back to reading it again and again, not even
knowing himself what it was about it that fascinated him. It was several years later
that Heidegger participated in a seminar led by Heinrich Rickert, in which they studied
two works of Rickert's student Emil Lask, which themselves were influenced by
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Husserl's LI. And this led Heidegger to work through LI again. However, the work
especially gained interest for Heidegger when, in 1916, Husserl came to Freiburg as
the successor to Heinrich Rickert (who went to Heidelburg).
Heidegger says that Husserl's instruction took the form of a step-wise exercise
in "phenomenological seeing," which required that one refrain from making unexamined use of philosophical notions, but which also involved refraining from any engagement with the authority of the great philosophical thinkers. Heidegger undertook in
1919 to teach while learning (lehrend-lernend) the method of phenomenological seeing,
while at the same time teaching a seminar on Aristotle. This inspired him to undertake a new study of LI, in which he found the distinction worked out in the Sixth
Investigation between sensuous and categorial intuition to be of significance for the
"manifold sense of being.11104 What he was learning from his phenomenological
studies appeared to him to be something which the Greeks had actually grasped better
as ~..,0sta.
Was die phanomenologischen Untersuchungen als die tragende Haltung des
Denkens neu gefunden haben, erweist sich als der Grundzug des griechischen
Denkens, wenn nicht gar der Philosophie als solcher. 105
The operative attitude of thought which had been newly discovered by phenomenology
proved to be the principle feature of Greek thought, if not of philosophy as such. It
could be said that Heidegger's perspective at this point transcended phenomenology
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toward the radical philosophical possibility of phenomenology. But the possibility, as
Heidegger remarks at the end of this essay, is higher than the actuality. That is, more
profound than what Husserl found (phenomenology) is the possibility of Husserl's discovery (the possibility of phenomenology). This seems to have been for Heidegger the
radical discovery of philosophy, or the ground from which philosophies emerge; it was
the emergence of Heidegger himself as an original philosopher. The revised reading
of phenomenology in the light of Heidegger's new insight into the Greeks, for sure, a
phenomenologically illuminated insight, entailed a decisive revision of what he viewed
as its central philosophical problematic.
Je entscheidender sich mir diese Einsicht klarte, um so bedningender wurde
die Frage: Woher and wie bestimmt sich, was nach dem Prinzip der Phanomenologie als »die Sache selbst« erfahren werden muB? Ist es das BewuBtsein
und seine Gegenstandlichkeit, oder ist es das Sein des Seienden in seiner Unverborgenheit und Verbergung? 106
What is it which following the phenomenological principle is to be experienced as "the
things themselves"? Is it consciousness and its objectivity, or is it the being of what is
in its unconcealment and concealment?

• • • •
The central task of Being and Time is to raise the question of the meaning of
being. And the method is proclaimed to be phenomenology. It is a work in phenomenological ontology, or an investigation into the meaning of being through a method
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that is characterized as phenomenological. However, it is obvious that Heidegger had
already transcended the philosophical problematics of the originator of the method.
The method itself is the theme of §7, "The phenomenological method of investigation," where he discusses "A. The concept of phenomenon"; "B. The concept of logos"; "C. The preliminary conception of phenomenology." In these subsections,

Heidegger uses an explication of the name "phenomenology" as a device for explaining what he means by the phenomenological method, and this explication departs
considerably from the style of any of Husserl's explications. Heidegger signals his
intention to free the term "phenomenology" here from any essentially Husserlian roots,
when he says, "The history of the word itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian
school, is here of no significance.11107 Moreover, the explication of the method on the
basis of the name makes possible a manoeuvre by which Heidegger turns immediately
to what it was he thought the Greeks had grasped, of which phenomenology was
merely a recent rediscovery. He says, "We shall set forth the preliminary conception
of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the term's two components, 'phenomenon' and 'logos', and by establishing the meaning of the name in which
these are put together. 11108 What follows is an interpretation of the Greek <j,a1v6µ&vov
and A.6yoc;, in which the central Husserlian themes and problems are stated in a
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different cast, while at the same time a certain advance in understanding what was
meant in the Greek is made by freely employing certain Husserlian concepts. Section
7 of the Introduction to Being and Time clearly incarnates the transcendence of
phenomenology toward the Greeks, or toward philosophy as such, which in "Mein
Weg in die Phiinomenologie" Heidegger says was the course of his own thought.
After the Introduction, phenomenology as a theme in Being and Time finds little
discussion.
In what ways the phenomenological method is involved in the development of
Being and Time can better be seen by examining the lecture course which preceded

the publication of BT, History of the Concept of Time. As was noted above, here we
find Heidegger's most direct and sustained discussion of Husserlian phenomenology.
Many of the themes which occupy BT are worked out in the lecture course in a form
very close to how they appear in BT. The present discussion will rely heavily on the
lecture course.
There is one development of LI which is singled out by Heidegger in "Mein
Weg in die Phiinomenologie" as especially significant to his understanding of the
ontological question which had occupied him from his earliest years: the distinction
worked out in the Sixth Investigation between sensuous and categorial intuition.
Heidegger devotes about twenty-five pages (all of §6) of HCT to explicating the
discovery of categorial intuition and its significance. There is also at least a reference
to the significance of the slogan "to the things themselves!" In HCT an explication of
these themes is worked out in ways that exhibit what become characteristically
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Heideggerian themes: discourse, everydayness, the world, existence, history, the workworld, and the like. The exposition of time only receives about 14 pages, before the
lecture course comes to an end. In any case, it appears to have been the logical
possibility of categorial intuition that best accords with the model offoundation, which
inspired a whole new world of philosophical relations, which emerge first in the
lecture course, and then in Being and Time. So, we should consider most significant
here what Heidegger understood of the newly discovered form of intuition and its
consequences for his style of description.
The concept of categorial intuition is worked out by Husserl in the utter
formality of an exercise in theory construction. It is intended as an element in the
theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre). The main point is to arrive at a more rigorous
and thoroughly developed sense of evidence and of objectivity. As was argued above,
Husserl is especially concerned with symbolically mediated experiences of the objective, as in mathematics, a problem whose scope it is increasingly apparent ranges far
beyond Husserl's original problem and which extends to the objectivity of the most
ordinary, everyday experiences. The impact of Husserl's work on the student is more
immediate; it lies in the actual modification of how one evaluates what is evident, in
the reflective exercise. We are not too surprised that Husserl taught, as Heidegger reports, in what must have been the very unconventional style of a step-wise exercise in
phenomenological seeing, nor that he was less interested in engaging the authority of
the great thinkers. Categorial intuition, after all, a form of intuition, would have been
something one was taught to distinguish in the course of these reflective exercises.
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Heidegger, on the other hand, always engaging the great thinkers, showed
more interest in discerning how the thought of the great thinkers has already pervaded
one's view. In fact, it turns out that the use of the very concept itself makes possible
Heidegger's demonstration of how what is seen is always already something talked
over to such an extent that he proclaims that "we do not say what we see, but rather
the reverse, we see what one says about the matter." 109 Of course, Heidegger too is
concerned with the objectivity of what is said, and particularly in connection with the
attainment of phenomenological results themselves.
Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there
is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its
indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating thesis." 110
Heidegger, like Husserl, is concerned with the fact that a gap can open between
intuition and expression, with the fact that expression can become uprooted from any
genuine grasp of what is said in it. He is concerned, in fact, with the problem of inauthentic understanding in a Husserlian sense, which is the sense in which mere symbols
are manipulated blindly without any actual apprehension of what the symbols supposedly express. For Heidegger, however, this pertains with equal force to the extant expressions of great thinkers. These too can be taken up and used without any real
grasp of the matters at issue. Moreover, there is more emphasis in Heidegger on the
gap as it functions in everyday understanding. This problem of the gap that opens
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between expression and understanding, the problem of the inauthentic use of symbols,
is the theoretical antecedent of the Heideggerian theme of inauthentic everydayness,
however much the concept of authenticity is modified in Heidegger.
The concept of categorial intuiti9n is especially important because of the
complex of relations involved in its explication. The phrase "categorial intuition" is
already philosophically provocative. For Kant, there were the categories of intuition
(space and time) and categories of the understanding (essentially derived from the
transcendental unity of apperception). In "intuition" is the notion of presence to
perception, the simply given sensuous appearance. In "categorial" is contained a
certain sense of ideality, or universality. It isn't clear in the traditional associations of
these words how we are to make sense of the expression "categorial intuition." It is a
concept which among modem philosophies is unique to phenomenology, though
something akin to it is evident in Plato. m What is meant in phenomenology by
"intuition" is no sort of privileged or mysterious awareness, but "simply apprehending
the bodily given as it shows itself." 112 "Intuition" means something quite close to the

sense it had had since Kant. When I look at my pencil, I see that it is yellow. If
asked how I know it is yellow, then I can answer in the philosophical sense by saying
that I know this through the intuition, that it is simply given to me in this way,

mwe can understand Plato's doctrine of recollection as akin to the notion of
categorial intuition, where it is argued, for example, that we must have pre-experienced such notions as "equality," since we couldn't have learned them empirically.
That is, Plato supposes in the doctrine of recollection that the universal is something
that one has actually perceived (intuited).
112
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without any reasoning or any sort of previously having learned about the matter. This
is what is meant by "simply apprehending." However, particularly since Kant, but
even with the British Empiricists, the cat~gorial (or universal) element of knowledge
would be something extra, something beyond the sensuously (intuitively) given, which
arises somehow through reason, reflection, thought, something more on the side of the
subject. The categorial would be something somehow put into the empirically given,
something not itself of the same empirical element. The expression "categorial intuition" means that the categorial is intuited, that it too is found there in the things
themselves, bodily given. The notion of categorial intuition is a Platonism, at least on
one reading of Plato. What is important to note here is the provocative nature of the
very expression "categorial intuition," which must have had something of the air of a
conceptual monstrosity, in view of the senses which had accrued conventionally to
"categorial" and "intuition."
Heidegger's exposition of categorial intuition in HCT is substantially true to
Husserl's. However, in Heidegger's explication, the significance of the discovery is
more closely interwoven with the more general sense of the way discourse is involved
in the way things show themselves. On the one hand, "Categorial acts are founded
acts; in other words, everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition." 113 On
the other hand, "categorial intuition is found in every concrete perception (perception
of a thing)." 114 In other words, categorial and sensuous intuition are complementary
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constituents of every intuition, and they stand in the complementary relations of a
founded (categorial) and founding (sensuous) content. Moreover, Heidegger expounds
at length upon the objectivity of the categorial, repeating parts of the Husserlian arguments against psychologistic interpretations of the categorial. The peculiarly Heideggerian turn of emphasis first becomes evident in the functional priority Heidegger
ascribes to the categorial over the sensuous:
When I perceive simply, moving about in my environmental world, when I see
houses, for example, I do not first see houses primarily in their individuation, in
their distinctiveness. Rather, I first see universally: this is a house. This "aswhat," the universal feature of house, is itself not expressly apprehended in what
it is, but is already coapprehended in simple intuition as that which to some
extent here illuminates what is given. 115
Not only do I first see universally, but the universal element, this as-what, functions
inexplicitly. This notion of the inexplicit is also referred to by Heidegger in the
phrase "something is experienced but not apprehended." 116 The inexplicitness, the
coapprehendedness of the categorial is, of course, already discussed as a possibility by

Husserl, where a second act of ideating abstraction is required to apprehended the
categorial explicitly. But it seems to take an increasingly important role in Heidegger,
who also comes to prefer the expression "thematic" and "nonthematic" as descriptive
of the distinction.
Where the role of the inexplicit, lived through, experienced but not apprehended categorial constitution of things becomes most important in Heidegger is
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through the function of discourse. Not only do I first see universally, but this sight is
always pervaded through and through by assertions. "We see what one says about the
matter." The distinction which Husserl raises as that between authentic and inauthentic thinking arose with him in the fact that thinking through symbolic prosthesis- as
in the use of mathematical symbols, which often may be unaccompanied by any
intuition of the matters themselves-can become detached from the matters themselves, can lose sight of them, can become cut adrift from what the thought is about.
Something similar pertains to inauthenticity in Heidegger. The pervasion of thought
by discourse, in Heidegger, however, receives a different emphasis, less a matter for
the philosophy of science than a matter for the whole of a meaningful life. It pertains
to the historicality of human existence. It's significance is above all to render the
central philosophical problematics as hermeneutic.
None of this should be taken as meaning that what is disclosed under the
sway of discourse is somehow less objective than what would appear to an uncontaminated gaze. It is not a matter of stripping the pure appearances of the disguises of discourse. What is shown by the thesis of categorial intuition is that what is given
always is more than the purely sensuous element. When I see houses, I first see
universally, of necessity. A house simply is not a collection of sense data. It is
primarily, in its very concreteness as an entity, that talked over, meaningfully pervaded
and practical possibility signified in discourse. This is the thing itself. What is given
in categorial intuition is founded on sensuousness, but it is itself an object of a higher
order than the sensuous.
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Heidegger's discussion of the phenomenological method in §7 of Being and
Time does not recapitulate what is said in the lecture course, History of the Concept of
Time, even though the latter went unpublished until very recently (1979 in German).

In BT he focuses on the meanings of "phenomenon" and "logos," with special
attention to their senses in the Greek. "'),hyoc,," he says, "means rather the same as
61111.oOv: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse." 117 What is
to be exhibited in phenomenology, he says, is "the Being of entities." Indeed, "[i]n
the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that
which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives." 118 This equivalence of phenomen<?logy and ontology appears to be rather
asserted than proven, though it is clear that "being" would be the phenomenon to be
exhibited in Being and Time, as that is the declared purpose of the work. In any case,
the point is well made that "that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which
relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise', is not just
this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities." 119 Being and Time is itself a discourse aimed at exhibiting being. And this task must first disclose the ways in which
it is hidden, covered up, disguised. That is, the first problem is to make plain the
necessity of raising the question, as it seems that what is to be exhibited is something
with which we are all quite well familiar.
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Our familiarity with being is precisely what keeps it covered up. As we are
told in HCT, we speak of being constantly, as in the statement "The chair is yellow."
Heidegger uses the example to illustrate categorial intuition. That is, I can sensuously
perceive the chair and the yellow, but being yellow, or the chair being yellow, which
are asserted in the proposition are not real, but ideal or categorial elements of what is
meant in the proposition. Though not real, the categorial element is yet bodily given
there simply, just as the real or sensuous elements are. The example is used by
Heidegger mostly to illustrate that there is categorial intuition. However, something
more can be shown by it, i.e., the nature of synthesis. There are two important
statements regarding the nature of synthesis in §7 of BT, which we should consider as
important for what will follow here when we consider Heidegger's concept of the
worldhood of the world.
First, there is a statement regarding what synthesis is:
And only because the function of 11.6yoc; as d1t6q,avcnc; lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the 11.6yoc; have the structural form of
cruv0Ecnc;. Here "synthesis" does not mean a binding and linking together of
representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the 'problem'
arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical
outside. Here the cruv has a purely apophantical signification and means letting
something be seen in its togetherness [Beisammen] with something-letting it be
seen as something. 120
Synthesis does not take two or more separated objects and bring them together.
Rather, it first displays something which one apprehends simply, by taking it apart,
setting out a part in relation to the whole, or setting parts in relation to one another,
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and at the same time bringing these parts together by indicating their togetherness.
This is how things are articulated. And from this example we can see how discourse
pervades such articulation. In this instance, the common subject-predicate form of
articulation pervades the form in which it is pointed out in discourse.
The second important statement Heidegger makes on the nature of synthesis is
the following:
When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be
seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it
lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and
with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. 121
This happens either because of an original failure of discourse to let the things be seen
from themselves as they are, or due to the tendency of discourse to trivialize, to make
the matters accessible in an inauthentic way. This, of course, happens above all to

being, of which we speak constantly, without any originary grasp of what we mean by
"being." Being is the most indispensable and, therefore, the most trivialized of
phenomena. Thus, the task of phenomenological ontology is to discover, or uncover,
or unconceal what we mean by "being."
This is the close connection in which Heidegger holds phenomenology and
ontology. His sense that the question was already a live one for the Greeks is the
basis on which he transcends Husserlian phenomenology, and arrives at the understanding expressed in the sentence, "Philosophy is universal phenomenological
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ontology." 122 Which is of course how his own thought transcends phenomenology
toward a newly discovered sense of the Qriginal task of philosophy. The involvement
of phenomenology from this point becomes mostly implicit. Yet the fundamental
discoveries can be plainly seen as operative throughout the analyses of Being and
Time. And our task will be to show how the Husserlian part/whole theory is involved

in Heidegger's exposition of the nature of worldhood and the significance of this for
the tradition.

3.2. Existence & World

Phenomenology serves Heidegger as the right way of access to whatever is to
be made the theme of ontological investigations. This involves for the most part
adhering to phenomenology's main resul~ in securing the right way to the things
themselves. We have already seen, in the previous section, how what is seen ordinarily is pervaded by discourse, that, in fact, we see what one says about the things. One
is not freed of this pervasion by finding some "neutral" standpoint, perhaps "prior to"
this discourse, at which one might arrive by simply "ignoring" what "they say" about
the things. It is rather a matter of grasping this very process of pervasion, and of
owning up to it in its very "otherness," of recognizing the dependence of one's "own"
perception and general awareness on the authorship of "the they." Heidegger is in this
way renewing a certain traditional imperative of philosophy, as the reflective life,
which exposes the ordinary, everyday lack of responsibility for what one thinks or
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believes. The way of access to the thing~ themselves is not to pretend to have not
heard the discourse that always already has pervaded whatever there is of significance.

It is rather a matter of uncovering the very uprootedness of significance in the "they."
To know one's self is to know that for the most part one has been already co-opted,
occupied, or even "haunted" by a view that is ultimately "no one's." I not only see
first universally, but also generically, or as "anyone."
When I am simply carried along in the way I relate to things by what one
says about them, my comportments toward things are "inauthentic," even in the Husserlian sense that they are based on a merely signitive relation to the actual things
towards which the discourses which carry me, or which I actually assist in carrying on,
are purportedly directed. What is specific to the Heideggerian analysis is the view that
inauthenticity is essentially constitutive of our relations to things, that inauthenticity
belongs to the constitution of everything manifested of worldly significance. Though
there is always still a possibility of authenticity, it is always founded on inauthenticity,
or, as Heidegger says, is a modification of inauthenticity. Things are at first given
under the sway of discourse, and they remain so mostly. The route to the things
themselves is not through finding a standpoint which is "prior" to this discourse, nor
by somehow pretending not to have heard it, nor by "controlling" for it by seeking a
broader "intersubjective" "synthesis." Rather, what is required is an authentic appropriation, actually accepting the discourse in the way of making it phenomenal, and

uncovering what is concealed in it. Phenomenological ontology (an expression which
for Heidegger is pleonastic) is at first and essentially hermeneutic. Further, to realize
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its possibility, which is to be a philosopher, is a matter of properly inhabiting the discourses under which understanding is held in sway. This is what Heidegger calls an
existentiel possibility of Dasein, a possibility of being-in-the-world which only gets
worked out in existing. This, I think, we could fairly identify as a Socratic element in
Heidegger's philosophy.
To bring ourselves before the things themselves, it is necessary to first
uncover how discourse has already pervaded their appearances. And by "discourse,"
[Rede] Heidegger means something broader than language. It includes every way in
which the issue of existence is worked out with an inconspicuous glance at the Others.
These Others are those for whom the world is there too, and they are disclosed as
constitutive of the very sense of things. First, they are given in the very nature of
artifacts and articles of use. In manufacture, things are always cut with reference to
someone for whose use the articles are intended, and we use things which have come
from someone, who shapes them with a view to certain uses. Moreover, it is less with
a view to any specific Others that objects are shaped, but rather with reference to a
sort of average useability. Even if I cannot discern the purpose of some article, the
fact that it has been manufactured, managed, placed, or otherwise is something taken
into the concern of Others is constitutive of its appearance. Finally, there are the ways
in which things have actually been talked over, the publicly formulated grammars
through which we learn to talk about and understand things, which "remains for the
most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way
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of conceiving." 123 Moreover, just as there prevail certain linguistically formulated
ways of interpreting, there are also exhibited certain publicly formulated styles of
usefulness, which are as determinative of the way things are interpreted as is what is
literally said.
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services
such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-oneanother dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the
Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit,
vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real
dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as
they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they
see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back;
we find 'shocking' what they find spocking. 124

Not only do we "see what one says about the matter," but we do what one does about
it as well. And in this doing is articulated an understanding which controls the
appearances at least as primordially as do the conventions and products of the language.
Not since Plato (with the possible exception of Nietzsche) has the necessity of
philosophy's eccentricity been propounded with such force and clarity as in BT. The
dictatorship of "the they" exerts a leveling, averaging influence, such that even those
things which may have once been gained for genuine insight by the utmost effort are
taken as easily understood and accessible to everyone.
Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get
interpreted, and it is always right-not because there is some distinctive and
primary relationship-of-Being in which it is related to 'Things', or because it
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avails itself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly
appropriated, but because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of
genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart of the matter' ["auf die Sachen"].
By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets
passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone. 125
The eccentricity of philosophy is not merely a matter of the need to somehow
get above "the great mass," for this can be accomplished in the way one shrinks back
from the great mass as one shrinks back. Such comportments are rooted in what
Heidegger calls "distantiality ["Abstiindigkeit"], which is the care for how one differs
from the Others, whether this care is merely for a difference to be leveled out (as in
"fitting in"), whether it is for the way one is lagging behind the Others and needs to
catch up, or whether it is a matter of one already having some priority over the Others
which one seeks to maintain. In fact, distantiality is better served by the idle curiosity
which is always "on the scent" of whatever is newest. The genuine and necessary
eccentricity of philosophy has nothing to do that sort of arrogance which has contempt
for the rabble or the ordinary. The eccentricity is rather a resoluteness, which tracks
the things themselves. The eccentricity of philosophy is not an affected eccentricity.
It is one that arises from the core of resoluteness, whose issue and measure is none

other than authenticity.
The point of departure for Heidegger's efforts to raise the question of the
meaning of being is to make the question transparent through interrogating the very
being of the entity which raises the question, our own being, which he identifies as
"Dasein," or, equivalently, as "being-in-the-world." But why give it these names,
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"Dasein" and "being-in-the-world"? Isn't calling our kind of being "being-in-theworld" already to load a complicated assumption into the characterization of this
entity, which ought properly to wait on the results of the investigation? It only seems
so, on account of a very fundamental and well-entrenched error in the traditional
ontologies. Heidegger takes his departure with a phenomenon of which we have a
certain primitive and pre-ontological experience. We never experience ourselves as
worldless, and thus this is never something that shows itself from the phenomena. The
notion of a worldless subject is only possible as the residue of an abstraction, though it
was a very natural abstraction, in that it is founded on certain essential characteristics
of the way Dasein is in its world. In any case, this primitive experience is that of our
own Being, to which attaches essentially the characteristic of mineness. Moreover,

there is never any experience of this being after death, beyond the world or in another
world, or before our worldly existence. 126 The issue of my being is always the issue
of my being here,127 in the world.
Thus, the starting point for an investigation into the meaning of being is an
existential analytic. We begin with an analysis of that being which is always already
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Heidegger explicitly claims that he does not wish to prejudice the question of
whether there is an after-life, but he says that whatever we could mean by such
expressions as "after-life" could only be clarified by understanding what we mean by
this life, in this world, in the world.
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The expression "Dasein" is more often translated ''Being-there," a translation
which is easily misleading to those who don't read German, for which reason it is
more often simply left untranslated. The "da" of "Dasein" means neither "here" nor
"there." For example, if you call someone on the phone and ask "/st Helmut da?" ("Is
Helmut there?"), the correct German answer may be "Nein, er ist nicht da?" ("No, he
is not here."), "here" and "there" being represented in German by the same word "da".
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an issue, what it means to be in the way that we are. Traditionally the phenomenon of
being-in-the-world has been missed, by interpreting it as something it isn't. That is,
we draw our idea of being from the entities encountered within the world which are
not of the character of Dasein. This is how the pre-ontologically experienced question
of the meaning of being deteriorates into a theory of present-at-hand entities. Moreover, it was discovered early on that there are certain ways in which whatever can
show itself as present-at-hand will always already128 have certain determinations, which
are those the ancients identified as the categories. Thus, Heidegger identifies categorial being as the being of things which D.asein encounters within the world which do

not have the character of being-in-the-world in the way Dasein is in the world.
Accordingly, Heidegger distinguishes the apriori characterization of Dasein from the
categorial of the present-at-hand by using the expression existentiale for the former.
"[A]ny entity," he says, "is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in
the broadest sense)." 129 In BT, the difference is developed formally in terms of a
distinction in the two senses of "in" as they function in the expressions "being-in-the
world," and "innerworldliness" (or, innerworldly entities, or being within the world).
An ontological characterization of the being-in of Dasein's being-in-the-world supplies
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the decisive formal propaedeutic to a fundamental revision of ancient ontological
assumptions, whose efficacy is shown to govern throughout modem philosophy.
First, it is important to grasp how the difference here is not the familiar
distinction of mind/body, subject/object, or any of the modem variations, simply with
added emphasis.
Descartes was well aware of the importance of distinguishing his own type of
being from that of the non-human, especially unconscious objects experienced in the
realm of the cogito, and the distinction h~ in one way or another been insisted on by
all but that rare sort of physicalist, who describes mind or experience as an "epiphenomenon," or the like. In fact, we find in Descartes Meditations this remarkable
statement: "I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently take some other object
in place of myself." 130 This would be imprudent indeed. What is it that Descartes is
afraid he will take in place of himself? Something that he could imagine himself to
be: a flame, a wind, a breath, an ether spread through the grosser parts. There is
more here than a mere simple assertion that humans aren't material things. We are
given a specific indication of where the ontological understanding of our kind of being
(thinking being) goes awry. One thing (something of which I can form an image) is
taken for another (me).
We can easily see the influence of Plato on Descartes; it shows through in the
very style of his arguments for a truth beyond the appearances. It is probably a fair

13

°Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by Eli7.a.beth S.
Haldane and G.R.T Ross, in Classics of Western Philosophy, edited by Steven M.
Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 314.

108
assumption, considering the importance of Descartes to the development of modernism, that what was at least partially at stake in Descartes' arguments (e.g., towers
which in the distance look round, look square when one gets closer) was the new
science, which was essentially an optics. Things aren't what they appear to be. The
sun doesn't pass overhead; we turn under it. The planets don't move at irregular
velocities (nor in epicycles); they follow the simple mathematical orbit of the ellipsis.
The essence of modern physics is actuall:y the progress of systematically proving in
what ways the real world is different from what it seems to natural perception. The
scientifically (or, theoretically) most significant discoveries are precisely those that
overturn the greatest weight of assumption, and especially of natural assumptions. The
success of modernism as a view is evident in the way every school child knows that
what appears to be solid is really mostly space (in the form of atomic and sub-atomic
interstices). The modern view displaced that which went beyond the world toward
God, and which interpreted innerworldly entities through reference to divine purposes.131 But what it displaced it with was a transcendence of the apparent world toward
one which the new optics showed to be more real and certain (as well as more fitting
to the limited, finite human intellect). Yet, what Descartes argues for is precisely a

presence, and a more real presence, beyond the worldly appearances. Though this is a
revolution respecting the world's significance, the essential distinction between the
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" • • • I should not be astonished if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does . . . and this reason suffices to convince me that the
species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or natural]
things; fir it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the
[inscrutable] ends of God." Descartes, Cahn 329.
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medieval and modem worlds, there is a continuity in the understanding of being as
presence.

What entities are present to in Descartes is, of course, the cogito. This too,
however, is present-in-the-world, just as things which are present to it in the world. It
is merely present under a different category of substance, as thinking substance rather
than as extended substance. Now, these become incommensurable substances. In the
language of Husserl's Third Investigation, the cogito is not a piece, or extended part of
the material world. Let us consider this precisely in relation to the Husserlian definition of extended parts and wholes, by reviewing the Husserlian text.
When a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially
belong to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole, we
speak of it as an extended whole, and of its pieces as extended parts. 132
Clearly, in describing the mind and body as belonging to distinct substances, Descartes
has separated their lowest genera in such a way that they cannot fit the Husserlian
definition of pieces of the same extended whole. However, there are ambiguities
introduced, for example, by Descartes' grouping both mind and matter under the genus
of created, as opposed to creator, substance. Moreover, though there is an incommensurability of mind and matter, famous as the modem mind/body problem, it seems that
the mind may nonetheless be present side-by-side with what is present to it. Without
explicitly citing the Husserlian formula, Heidegger does criticize the image of "sideby-side" existence as the model of how the being of innerworldly entities is related to
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that of Dasein, and he does this in much the same language which was used by
Husserl in the explication of intentionality.
What is lacking in Descartes, according to Heidegger, is an analysis of beingin-the-world, especially with respect to the relation of being-in. In fact, the Cartesian
analysis of being never goes beyond what is essentially a categorial distinction
between entities, which are either uncreated (God) or created; and, in the latter case,
either res extensa (matter) or res cogitans (mind). What Descartes means by "substance" is "nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other
entity in order to be." 133 Of course, only God is absolutely substance, needing nothing
whatever in order to be; while mind and matter are only substance relatively to other
created substance, not needing any other created entities in order to be. How the term
"substance" can embrace the infinite difference between God and creation is not
something Descartes attempts to resolve, though he clearly indicates his awareness of
of the problem. "[T]he idea of substantiality," says Heidegger, "... not only remains
unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of
clarification, and gets represented indirectly by way of whatever substantial property
belongs most pre-eminently to the particular substance." 134 Neither the being of res
cogitans nor of res extensa is actually ever made problematic. Rather, the properties

which distinguish them categorially are formulated. It is shown that the world is best
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known through the properties of extension, but the being of the knowing, or the

knower, is left in obscurity. Or, it is referred to the productive activity of God, and
thus it falls under the ancient notion of being as product (in which respect res extensa
and res cogitans are not distinguished). The cogito, though differing categorially, and
though lacking extensive properties, is merely interpreted as another sort of present-athand entity.
In contrast, Heidegger distinguishes Dasein's being from that of things in the

world by an analysis of the way the being-in of being-in-the-world differs from the
way other entities are in the world. Heidegger's analysis of the way things other than
Dasein are in the world will be discussed in the following section. What needs to be
noted here is how Heidegger's treatment of the way Dasein is in-the-world supplies the
formal basis for a certain ontological revolution. Once the issue of Dasein's being-in
is made the basis of an ontological revision of our own kind of being, this is further
leveraged into a reconception of the being of things unlike Dasein. And with this a
different 'world' is opened up. Heidegger's destructive or negative task is to break
down the picture of side-by-side existence, which functions always implicitly as the
traditional conception of how entities are related to one another. While our own kind
of being is asserted to be fundamentally different from the way things are, it is still, at
least implicitly, assumed that we are somehow side-by-side with other entities, whether
like ourselves or mere things. Descartes is the best expositor of this view, at least in
its modem form. Heidegger's constructive or positive task is to explain, if not as sideby-side, how entities are related. This he does through the analysis of the two senses
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of "in" which he signifies by "being-in-the-world" and "innerworldliness." It could be
said that where the tradition has focused the question of being upon substance,
Heidegger's analysis is strategically grounded in a focus on relation. These fundamentals, "being-in" and "innerworldliness," are constitutive of the entities so characterized.
Which is to say that Dasein and innerworldly entities are not first substantial beings,
which then get involved in relations, but they are apriori and unive7'Sally relational. To
positively explicate these relations, as constitutive of the entities involved, is the
constructive task, i.e., the task of supplying a replacement for the image of side-byside existence.
What is usually meant, Heidegger says, by "being-in" is the kind of being in
which one thing is in another "as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the
cupboard."
By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended 'in'
space have to each other with regard to their location in that space. Both water
and glass, garment and cupboard, are 'in' space and 'at' a location, and both in
the same way. This relationship of Being can be expanded: for instance, the
bench is in the lecture-room, the lecture-room is in the university, the university
is in the city, and so on, until we can say that the bench is 'in world-space'. All
entities whose Being 'in' one another can thus be described have the same kind
of Being-that of Being-present-at-hand-as Things occurring 'within' the
world. 135
It is important to notice precisely how the description of the sense of "in" given in this
passage corresponds to the Husserlian description of extensive part/whole relations. It
does this first in an obvious way, by reference to the way the objects are "extended 'in'
space," Husserl's own prime example. But, beyond this identity of illustrative matter,
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there is the formally specified characteristic of the relation as one in which the relata
are 'in' space and 'at' a location "in the same way," 'within' the world," "'in' world
space." What is said to be "in the same way" here is the being in of the relata. It is a
modality of being, which is specified relationally rather than substantively. What is at
issue here is the being of the entities so related, where the relation is constitutive of
them as they are. Such entities "have the same kind of Being." Which is to say,
formally, that they essentially belong to the same lowest Genus. Things so related
occupy the objective stratum of things in world space, side-by-side, etc.
This is the most ordinary sense in which we talk about things "being in" one
another, and the sense is easily carried over to speak of how we are 'in' the world.
But this is not the way Heidegger wants to describe Dasein's "being-in." It is again
important to note that Heidegger's thesis depends on a certain form al shift in the
traditional style of ontology, which always takes being as fundamentally substantive.
"Being-in," a relational being, is not founded on entities, which are first substantially
and then brought together under a relation. It is rather the case that the relata, in both
senses of "being in," are/ounded on these possibilities of relation. That is, the
relations are constitutive of the entities themselves. We tend to want to add "constitutive of them as relational," or "qua relational." But, it must be remembered that the
entities at issue are never given without these constitutive features of them, and thus
these modalities of 'being in' are to be understood as a priori constitutive of the very
possibilities of the entities so characterized, and it is only our prejudice for the
substantiality of entities as a fundament of being that draws us constantly toward the
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ordinary understanding of being. The already fully developed way of conceiving
things which lies hidden in the language is carried over vaguely to condition our
understanding of our own "being in," where we appear as a sort of substantiality there
beside things, which are likewise substances, though of another substantial genus.
The "being-in" which pertains to Dasein's "being-in-the-world" expresses a
different relation altogether:
Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed
[zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with
something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it,
making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking,
accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining . . .
All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being. 136
This concern is founded in Dasein's being as care, a term to which Heidegger devotes
considerable elaboration in BT, but whic~ we need not elaborate here. In the following section we will discuss the other side of the relation, i.e., that with which or about
which Dasein is concerned in its being-in, i.e., the world and innerworldly entities.

And, there we will see that mere spatial side-by-sidedness is not sufficient to describe
or explain even the way things are 'in' the world. Here we merely wish to consider
how Heidegger analyses the way the spatial sense conceals the true ontological nature
of Dasein's being-in.
The phenomenon of being-in is something already experienced pre-ontologically. That is, Dasein already has an understanding of being, in which its being is an
issue for itself, and it already comports itself in some way toward entities on the basis
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of this understanding. However, when we seek to interpret and articulate this understanding ontologically, we miss the original, primitive phenomenon of being-in by an
explanation of presence at hand. The question of the meaning of being, towards which
the whole of BT is oriented is to take its departure from that fundamental phenomenon
of "being-in-the-world," the very being which is most immediate and familiar to the
questioning Dasein. This is no abstract or barely attainable phenomenon; it is the very
issue of Dasein's being-in-the-world, which is at once the closest sense in which the
question of the meaning of being can occur. However, this pre-ontological experience
of being is prior to any theoretical or expressed interpretation of it. For the most part,
Dasein takes over the readily accessible, though inappropriate ways at its disposal for
articulating the sense of this being. The most readily available way of interpreting
"beings" is that which is developed in the course of talking things over, which is
primarily a talk about things present at hand within the world. There is a certain
transfer of the sense of how things within the world are conceived to the discourse on
all beings, including Dasein. Which is to say, in a way reminiscent of Descartes'
caution to "not take something else in place of myself," Dasein does take something
else in place of itself as itself; it understands the character of its own being in terms of
the very being which it isn't, i.e., those things within the world with which it has concemful dealings. Heidegger says of the way our pre-ontological experience is
obscured in the conventional interpretations,
. . . this 'seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining' is
itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein's Being, which is
such that Dasein itself-and this means also its Being-in-the-world-gets its
ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which
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it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being
which they possess. 137
Dasein is not related to the world in which it is as one entity set over
opposite to another. Rather, Dasein's being isfounded on being-in and on the world.
There can be no Dasein, which is being-in-the-world, without the constitutive items of
the world and being-in. Dasein is dependent on these constitutive items; it is not an
independent piece side-by-side with other parts of the world. The latter delusion
arises, not from authentic experience of Dasein's being, but from the inauthentic,
uprooted habits of discourse, which are preoccupied with indicating entities present-athand in their presence-at-hand. In this way Dasein forgets itself. It signifies itself
inauthentically, both in the Husserlian sense (emptily, with a mere play of signs) and
in the Heideggerian sense (from the world, as one discourses on the matter, as one is
carried along and sees, and as one discourses on "the mind," "spirit," "life" and
"death," etc.).
On the one hand, grasping and properly explaining what is at issue here (the
being of Dasein) is a matter of taking one's orientation from the things themselves, of
primordially seeing the phenomena. On the other, there is the methodological labor of
a phenomenological description, of rightly explaining. The primary tool employed by
Heidegger here is plainly the method of part/whole analysis developed in the Third
Investigation. Having established in the second chapter of the First Division a more
apt sense of "being-in" for the being-in of Dasein, a sense which overturns all piece-
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wise images of Dasein, as side-by-side with the world and entities within the world,
the fifth chapter of the First Division then articulates in detail the constitutive moments of being-in. We need not rehearse that description here, as all we wish to make
is the formal point of how Heidegger's analysis is dependent on a certain view of
part/whole relations, as well as of dependence and foundation.

3.3. Things & Innerworldliness

There is perhaps nothing more intellectually taken for granted than the superiority of modernism in understanding the nature of "things," i.e., what is commonly
thought of as the material world. Thus, in his analysis of the "worldhood of the
world," Heidegger is most decisively engaging modernism, and engaging it precisely
with respect to its view of what it presumes to best understand and to understand best.
Surely, no one would deny that modernism does in fact understand the nature of the
material world better than anyone has ever previously understood it. And it is not the
point of Heidegger's attack on modernism to deny the truth or accomplishments of it,
but rather to more surely disclose its ontological grounds, to examine these ground
essentially, and to surpass it in its own central tendency, which is to understand the
world and the things in the world. The challenge that Heidegger throws up to
modernism is that it has not yet understood the world well enough, and perhaps not
even understood the world at all; in fact,.modernism, says Heidegger, has missed the
phenomenon of the world altogether, and it has also missed the way the world's worldhood is announced within innerworldly things. The objective of the chapter on "The
Worldhood of the World" is to reach a better understanding of innerworldly things and
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of the world, in just the sense that philosophy usually speaks of "things" and "the
world"; these are the things at issue in the third chapter of BT, not another world, nor
the world in some other sense of "world." That is, Heidegger will show in this
chapter that modernism is philosophically in error, and it is principally in error with
respect to what it takes as its prime object.

It is not only modernism's understanding of the world that Heidegger challenges, but that of the whole ontological tradition, at least as far back as Aristotle,
from whom we get the notion of substance. Substance is that which underlies things.
In the ontological tradition "substance comes to simply signify the most fundamental
being, accounted for by nothing further, not being relative to anything else and that to
which the being of everything else is referred. The mutual exclusion of substance
from substance is already implied in Aristotle's descriptions of it: "With regard to
primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility [of being relative],
for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative"; 138 "it is a common
characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject"; 139 "the most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the
same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities." 140 These characteristics all point to
the fundamental separation and independence characteristic of relations between
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substances. And it is in terms of this sort of formal characterization that Heidegger
carries out his destruction. The destruction can be applied equally well to any
ontology that is founded on the notion of substance (always identified by its formal
features, whether it be called "substance," "presence," or any other name).
Descartes is only the most extreme expositor of the ontological view that
begins with the concept of substance. But, he is especially important to us, as it is
also with Descartes that we see the beginnings of the modern world view. The
modem sciences, with their descriptions 9f the world and everything in it, all have
their foundations in this extreme view. Moreover, as is often remarked, Cartesianism
has become practically the very form of modem common sense. It is for these reasons
that it is especially important that we understand Heidegger's destruction of the
concept of substance with respect to the way it is developed in Descartes. What is
sighted in the destruction of Cartesian ontology are the very things about which
Cartesianism is presumed to be most illuminating, as the point is that it is precisely
about these things that modernism is most in error. Which is to say that Heidegger
should not be read as thinking that what happens in Descartes is a matter of misplaced
emphasis; rather what has been correctly emphasized (the being of ordinary material
objects) has been seen wrongly and has been misunderstood.
Where modernism takes a wrong tum is in the formal aspect of the concept of
substance. Previous criticisms of the concept of substance have mostly faulted the
notion of substance materially, as in the phenomenalist argument that the assumption
of something underlying and being the subject of the evident qualities, which one
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would assume are supported by it, uselessly multiplies entities. What Heidegger is
interested in is the substantiality of substance. As we have indicated, already in
Aristotle, what was most characteristic of substance is its absence of relation, its selfsubsistence, having neither its parts nor whole relative. Descartes repeats this formula
by defining substance by its independence: its not needing anything else in order to be.
Of course, he draws the further distinction of saying that only God is substance
absolutely, absolutely not needing anything further than Himself to be, while independence can be predicated of created beings only relatively; i.e. asserting only that
created substance needs no other created substance in order to be.

It is easy to see that Descartes' formula for the substantiality of substance fits
the Husserlian definition of extensive wholes. That is, in ens creatum we have a
whole whose parts are of the same last genus, en creatum, are all outside of and
independent of one another, etc. To be substantial is no more than to be a piece of a
substantial whole or to be the substantial whole itself. Descartes subtracts everything
characteristic of the entities of experience that can be subtracted and still imagine
those entities as being, and he thereby arrives at extension as the most fundamental
attribute by which entities can be identified as being. Or, as Heidegger says:
Because 'Being' is not in fact accessible as an entity, it is expressed through
attributes-definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are. Being is not expressed through just any such characteristics, but rather through those satisfying in the purist manner that meaning
of "Being" and "substantiality," which has still been tacitly presupposed. To the
substantiafinita as res corporea, what must primarily be 'assigned' is the extensio.141
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It is this reduction of entities to the same fundamental attributes (independence and
extension) that places them all in the same last genus; the method of systematic doubt
is already a search for something like that, something indifferently applicable to all of
them. Primarily what Husserl's theory has added to the usual conception of extensive
wholes is his emphasis on the feature of independence, as well as the mutual indifference of the parts to one another.
The revolutionary significance of Cartesian philosophy was that through the
model of side-by-side relations it focused attention on the order of things this side of
the theological transcendence, by insisting that the finite human intellect could hardly
comprehend God's purposes, a thesis by which he also dismisses final causes as a
legitimate form of explanation in the natural order. With the withdrawal of knowledge
(natural science) form the realm of religious transcendence, there is instituted a new
transcendence, which takes the form of an optics. It is a transcendence which corrects
for such errors of appearance as that square towers when seen from a distance look
round, and with this it discloses the real world as unlike its appearances. Although
this is clearly a form of transcendence, "~anscendence" recedes as a theme from
modem thinking. Transcendence itself is something that one can only think about in
terms of side-by-side relations, maybe of a subject and object (both substantially
conceived). And it is as much this picture of indifferently side-by-side pieces of
material substance that will fall under Heidegger's destruction of modem ontology.
However, our concern here is only with what is categorial, having to do with the
possibility of innerworldly entities, those
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which don't have the character of Dasein.
In opposition to the mutually independent pieces of the world supposed by the

concept of substance, Heidegger argues for another sort of categoriality, which he calls
"innerworldliness." To the substantiality of the substantial thing, he opposes the
innerworldliness of the innerworldly thing. To highlight it, we can represent this as a
formal analogy:

innerworldliness: innerworldly enti~ies :: substantiality: substantial entities

Innerwoldliness and substantiality are forms of categoriality. The destruction of
modem ontology and the institution of another ontological order is implicitly guided
by this analogy,142 at least as far as the categorial component of the destruction and
analysis. The justification of instituting innerworldliness as a categorial is the premise
that the things we come across, things in the ordinary sense, are "always already"
(Heidegger's germanization of "universal apriori ") within the world. The categoriality
of innerworldliness could trivially be justified, by a limitation of the theme, as when
Heidegger explicitly limits the analysis of Dasein to being-in-the-world. But clearly
the point is to establish the ontological p~ority of innerworldliness over substantiality,
which Heidegger seeks in several ways, including the demonstration that substantiality
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This can only be seen by reading the relevant chapters in the light of the
analogy, which is expressed, in an oblique context, in HCT, 172c: "The word
'substantia' has a double meaning: first, the entity itself which is in the mode of being
of substance, and at the same time substantiality. This corresponds to our distinction
between world as the things which are in the world and worldhood as the mode of
being of the world, where we must however emphasize that the sense of worldhood
and the structure of substantiality are radically distinct."
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("presence at hand") is a mode of being founded on innerworldliness (as "readiness to
hand").
The Greeks, says Heidegger, had a felicitous word for things:
"1tp4,yµa'ta-that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings
(1tpd.~1~)." 143 There is more wisdom revealed, for Heidegger, in this choice of words
than in the ancient ontology. Things show themselves in our having to do with them
in our concernful dealings, and only by a modification of our having to do with them
do we merely look at them, as attending to their look, or as reflecting on them in their
pure presence (presence at hand). Proximally and for the most part (or, immediately
and usually) we are guided in our dealings with things by a kind of sight that Heidegger calls "circumspection." That things matter to Dasein is expressed in Heidegger by
the term "concern," which then appears in the Heideggerian compounds "circumspective concern" and "concernful circumspection," which reflect the sense that the
proximate and usual mattering of things is one guided by a looking around appropriate
to concern and that this looking around is a looking toward what matters. Now,
concern is an existentiale, not a categoriale; it is a constituent of Dasein, not of things.

It is Dasein's way of being toward things, which Heidegger distinguishes from solicitude, which again has its own forms of sight. We will not follow these relations so far
as to the existential analysis, as our objective is only to see how Heidegger's destruction of the Cartesian ontology of innerworldly entities makes use of Husserl's
part/whole theory. The point to get here is that things are sighted in more ways than
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by merely looking at them as present-at-hand entities. And we must see how this is
possible and what it means ontologically.
With the concept of categorial intuition, of which Heidegger makes so much
in his explicit discussions of the phenomenological method, phenomenology first
formulates the possibility of a founded intuition. What we are seeking in Heidegger's
phenomenological description of the being of things is what he describes as the
categorial constitution of them. As with Kant, we are seeking what they are universal-

ly and apriori, which in Heidegger is germanized to what they are immer schon, which
is always already. Moreover, for phenomenology, the categories do not constitute
subjectivity, such that they are merely the forms in which objects appear to a subject
of necessity; but they themselves are intuited through the process of categorial
intuition; they too are objective. The phenomenological categories are not apriori on
account of subjectivity always bringing these forms prior and ready to experience, but
because what we find is that things always were what is discovered about them in a
categorial intuition. Through the doctrine of categorial intuition, the phenomenological
"apriori" is closer to Plato than to Kant.
Heidegger musters examples to show the categoriality of innerworldliness.
These examples are of perfectly ordinary things, average things, much as Descartes
uses a ball of wax, or some men out on the street wearing raincoats. They are much
like the average geometrical figures, average triangles and such, which Kant says the
geometer uses to reason to the general case, through disregarding anything that could
not be assumed of any of them as general exemplars of the category.
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Following the clue of the Greek "1tpq:yµa'ta, 11 Heidegger chooses to call
innerworldly entities, those things encountered in the world, by the German word
"Zeug." It can mean "material" in the textile sense, but it also appears in such words

as "Spielzeug" (toy), "Werkzeug" (tool) or "Flugzeug" (airplane). Macquarrie and
Robinson translate it into English as "equipment." "Equipment" is as good a translation as any, but it is easier to understand, if one bears in mind the Greek "1tp4yµa'ta,"
as Heidegger means to pragmatize all innerworldly entities, and we normally only use
"equipment" in English for a certain sort of artifact. Where "equipment" serves well is
in that the formal characteristics of equipment, its "equipmentality," is a general model
or paradigm of the categorial structure of innerworldly entities. Of course, the
evidence for this must be read off from the way things actually show themselves; it is
not merely a matter of the possibility of ~ g things as equipment, but of discovering
that this structure is a necessary condition of the possibility of innerworldly entities.
That is, grasping the fundamentally pragmatic character of things is a matter of categorial intuition.
Equipment, far from being characterized by its independence, its lack of being
founded in anything else, or its being distinctly articulated into pieces which are all
fundamentally outside of one another, is always in a certain way relational:
Equipment-in accordance with its equipmentality-always is in terms of its
belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table,
lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves
proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill
up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken
as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four
walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this
the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equip-
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ment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been
discovered. 144
Thus we have a total complex of equipment, out of which any particular item shows
itself. Further, Heidegger is more specific about the relational character of this
belonging to a context, which is everywhere constitutive of equipment:
Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. ... Equipment is
essentially 'something in-order-to .. .'. A totality of equipment is constituted by
the various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness,
usability, manipulability.145
The equipmentality of equipment precludes by its very essence the structure of
substance. An adequate intuition of the categorial form of equipment is assisted by an
exemplary list of various ways of the 'in-order-to' constitutive of equipment: serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In contrast to the "presence-at-hand"
of substance, these ways are also constitutive of the innerworldly entity's "readiness-tohand.''

It is important to not confuse Heidegger's concept of readiness-to-hand (equipmentality, etc.) with a mere acknowledgement of relations extant between things. This
would again be to merely reinstate the picture of side-by-side relations that the model
of equipment is intended to displace. And there are several arguments for the
ontological priority of an entity's readiness to hand over its presence at hand, of its
innerworldliness to its substantiality.
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First, there is the fact that the ontological tradition has presumptuously
privileged a certain kind of knowing and has ordered the question of being in accordance with this way of knowing: thematically. In fact, this isn't true most of the time,
nor immediately (proximally). For the most part, we know things in a way Heidegger
calls familiarly. This starts with a familiarity with the world. Dasein, which is always
already in the world, discovers things always against the prior discovery of a world as
the wherein of its existence. This prior familiarity with the world follows from
Heidegger's starting point: the question of the meaning of being, directed through an
interrogation of "being-in-the-world," of which we are primordial familiar as our own
"being-here." But we need to look more closely at the structure of what is meant by
"familiarity."
When using a hammer (to follow Heidegger's famous example), we don't
usually (for the most part) attend to the hammer itself, but to what we are doing with
it. But this is how we know the hammer, in hammering with it. Its specific manipulability as a hammer would never be disclosed by merely gazing at it as something
present. Hammers are unders'tood in hammering, as involved in the hammering, most
likely involved in nailing something down. But, in this way, the more the hammer
recedes from attention, all the more is it grasped in this essential involvement of it in
hammering. That is, it is best known non-thematically. It does not become nonthematic through our looking away from it, but by a certain sort of looking through it
toward what it's involved in. That is, equipment shows itself most essentially as what
it is when it functions transparently, as do the words of language. Familiarity is the

128

structure of this being towards something thematic on the basis of something in which
Dasein absorbs itself as a transparent (noh-thematic) basis. Dasein founds its directedness on familiarity. But it is not the case that there is first a familiarity independently
established at one moment, which is then applied to some further element; rather,
familiarity, as essentially foundational, is established precisely in the moment of
transcendence. We become familiar with something not by looking at it, but by
looking at something through it. To venture a pedagogical example, we become
familiar with something not through the study of it, but through understanding
something else on the basis of it, even if the thematic study of it is propaedeutic to the
possibility of its becoming familiar. To say that our familiarity with the world is
"primordial" is to say that this familiarity is prior to any involvement in any particular
things whatsoever.
This is how Heidegger overturns the traditionally presumed priority of our
thematic knowledge of entities, which in turn undermines the traditional ontological
priority based on this presumed epistemic priority of the thematic. We see already the
impact of the Husserlian studies in intentional complexes, with their non-thematic
constituents, etc., though that is not the main issue here. What we are concerned with
in this study is how the categorial structure of innerworldly entities is brought to the
destruction of the traditional ontology of substantial things. And this mostly turns on
showing how the way things are in the world is not at all the way pieces belong to
extensive wholes.
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The general structure of belonging-to that Heidegger attributes to things is
what he calls "reference" ("Verweisung'1. With equipment there is always a reference.
The general character of what Heidegger means by "reference" is best gathered from
his examples of it. With respect to Nature:
The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is waterpower, the wind is wind 'in the sails. 146
Further, when things are produced, there are references to materials and to the sources
of materials:
But the work to be produced is not merely usable for something. The production itself is a using of something for something. In the work there is also a
reference or assignment to "materials': the work is dependent on [angewiesen
auf] leather, thread, needles, and the like. Leather, moreover is produced from
hides. These are taken from animals, which someone else has raised....
Hammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral,
wood, in that they consist of these. 147
There are the references to what something will be used for and the suitability of it for
that use, but also there are the references to the users for whom we produce things:
The work produced refers not only to the "towards-which" of its usability and
the "whereof' of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an
assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his
figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are
produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is
merely indefinite, and points to the random, the average. 148
Moreover, there are the references to the publicly interpreted Nature which are built
into the artifacts of civilized places:
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In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some
definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an
installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific
changes in the presence or absence of daylight-the 'position of the sun'.149

It is through these references that things belong to the totality of significance which
Heidegger identifies with the world's worldhood.
Some important clarifications are in order on the nature of reference. First, it
is not the same as signification; the point is not to look around and think of things as

though they were signs. Signs are a special kind of equipment for Heidegger. And,
as equipment, signs too have a constitutive reference, a sort of readiness-to-hand,
which allows them to be signs. A sign i$ "equipment for indicating." On the basis of
this referential structure, which assigns indicating to something, the sign can then
indicate. He exemplifies the distinction with the description of how a tum signal on a
car both is constituted through a referential structure and "refers" in the sense of
indicating:
This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of
vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment,
it is constituted by reference or assignment. It has the character of the "in-orderto", its own definite serviceability; it is for indicating. This indicating which the
sign performs can be taken as a kind of 'referring'. But here we must notice that
this 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment.
Instead, 'referring' as indicating is grounded in the Being-structure of
equipment, in serviceability for .... But an entity may have serviceability
without thereby becoming a sign. 150_
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Reference in this special sense has a structural similitude to the function of signs. But
clearly Heidegger means to separate this function (signification) from what he wants to
call reference. Reference in this sense is a categoriale. It is an apriori and universal
constituent, belonging to the innerwoldliness, of innerworldly entities. Phenomenologically, reference shows itself to a categorial intuition, though we are primordially
familiar with it (preontologically), as this familiarity is necessary to the possibility of
our preontological understanding of any innerworldly entity whatsoever.
References are made specific in the serviceabilites, conducivenesses, usabilities, manipulabilities, etc., by which things are involved in the possibilities of mattering to Dasein. And this is not merely a subjective or psychological sort of mattering.
The light overhead actually is suitable for lighting the table and paper on which the
pen writes-things are in these ways, and are more primordially in these ways than
they are in the modes given over to the traditionally privileged ways of knowing them,
which always take them as present-at-hand entities. Citing the manipulability and
handiness of the hammer, Heidegger says, "Only because equipment has this 'Being-initself and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our
disposal." 151 This "Being-in-itself' constituted by the various modes of reference is the
point of destruction of the Cartesian onto_logy, as this being is always founded on a
familiarity with the world (the wherein of Dasein).
Things do not refer simply, but are caught up in a whole chain of references:
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With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement:
with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly
call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there
is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there
is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for
the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein -that is to say, for the sake
of a possibility of Dasein's Being. 152

It is important to see this "involvement" structure correctly. Heidegger describes it as
characterized by the expression "with . . . in . . ., " as in "with hammering, there is an
involvement in making something fast." We have both a reference and a co-reference.
Let's spell it out: Suppose we want to eat, and we contemplate ordering out or
cooking something, and opt for the cooking. Then cooking is involved in getting
something to eat. Then there may be the use of a pan in cooking, and we would say
that the pan is involved in cooking: the pan is involved in cooking, and cooking is
involved in getting something to eat; and there is an involvement of the pan with
cooking in getting something to eat; there is a reference of the pan to cooking and a
co-reference of the pan to getting something to eat.

It is in terms of the referential structure of innerworldly entities that Heidegger argues even for a non-extensional conception of space. Space is disclosed as
element of the referential structure of ~gs: "they always are ready-to-hand already
in individual places." 153
With anything encountered as ready-to-hand there is always an involvement in
[bei] a region. To the totality of involvements which makes up the Being of the
ready-to-hand within-the world, there belongs a spatial involvement which has
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the character of a region. By reason of such an involvement, the ready-to-hand
becomes something which we can come across and ascertain as having form and
direction. 154
Everything is available in its place. Things are always within a region, in a certain
direction. But that region is itself lit up by the circumspection which locates what is
ready-to-hand there. Spatiality is evidenced primarily as a co-referent: with anything
ready-to-hand there is an involvement in a region, just as with hammering there is an
involvement in fastening something down, just as with using a pan there is an involvement in cooking.
Then what of the evident possibility of regarding worldly things as substantial
or founded on substance? This is made possible by a modification of the evident
which abstracts from things as they actually are.
The homogenous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we
encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character of the
ready-to-hand gets specifically deprived of its worldhood. 155
However, if worldhood is a necessary constituent of the being of innerworldly entities,
then depriving the ready-to-hand of its innerworldliness is to turn away from the actual

being of the ready-to-hand, whatever calc;ulative purposes may be served by this
manoeuver.
Thus, to be a part of the world, to belong to the world or to be within the
world (as a thing) means, for Heidegger, to be a part of the referential totality uncovered as the wherein of Dasein's existence. It is at every point articulated on a familiar-
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ity, and it is everywhere pervaded by involvements. The part/whole structure is thus
that of significance, rather than of the spatial homogeneity. The ways of this being-in,
or being part of, are serviceability, convenience, obstruction, threatening, referring,
handiness, etc., whose structures are not that of side-by-side, indifferent, substantial
relations. And it is on the basis of these formal differences, rooted in the Third
Investigation, that Heidegger's destruction is carried out.

CHAPTER4

CONCLUSION

The point of this research has been to explore the relation between Husserl's
part/whole theory (Third Investigation) and Heidegger's analysis of the worldhood of
the world, with emphasis on his destruction of the Cartesian ontology. We have tried
to show in what ways the "destruction" of the traditional ontology (especially in its
Cartesian form) is dependent on the part/whole theory. Although Heidegger does not
explicitly discuss Husserl's part/whole theory in his own expositions of the phenomenological method, that he is using the Husserlian theory is evident from the fact that it
is the Husserlian distinctions which are ~wn, and it is in the Husserlian language of
"side-by-side" relations, from his use of the concept of "foundation," from the fundamental role of "independence" which he attributes to Cartesian substance, etc.
It was first necessary to conduct a study of the Husserlian theory itself, to

spell out and clarify its elements and to indicate the general significance of the
fundamental distinctions. After exaroininB the first essential distinction (piece/whole
vs. moment/whole), we examined Husserl's general thesis that there is a multiplicity of
part/whole forms and his sketch of wherein (respecting what formally specifiable
characteristics) one might distinguish the various types. And then (in section 2.4) we
devoted considerable attention to the basic concept of extended wholes, which was
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important for the sake of better perceiving how Descartes' ontology of the world corresponds to the model of extensive wholes._ In keeping with remarks in the Introduction,
on Husserl's own application of the part/whole theory to other themes within the rest
of LI, and on its central significance for the development of Husserl's thought even
beyond LI, in Section 2.5 one of Husserl's own applications of the part/whole theory is
exhibited: to the theory of dependent and independent meanings. This application is
especially important for the problem at hand, on account of the Heideggerian equivalence of world and significance, where innerworldly entities belong to the world more
in the way of partial meanings than as pieces of something extended. Section 2.6 explored the important concept of categorial intuition in its connection with the
part/whole theory, especially with respect to the ideality of the part/whole forms and
how the forms are intuited. Heidegger's own discussions of categorial intuition
indicate that this concept played a very important role in Heidegger's grasp and
interpretation of phenomenology.
We began the third chapter with a discussion of Heidegger's connection with
Husserl and with phenomenology. It is worth being reminded of Heidegger's indebtedness to Husserl, as well as to see the early roots of his transcendence of phenomenology. This transcendence lies in his earliest researches into the problem of the
meaning of being, which, as we saw, started with his attempts to work out the
ambiguities of "being" in Aristotle. In view of the profound importance of Heidegger's
own philosophical work, it is easy to neglect those features of his thought which
originated as phenomenology. It is a major point of the present thesis to draw one
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particular connection of Heidegger's thought to phenomenology. We examined the
article "Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie," as it is a very late text of Heidegger's, and
in it he explains how he came to discover phenomenology in the course of researching
his original problem on the meaning of the being, and some of the factors important
for our thesis are indicated there. Section 32 brings out the distinction between the
existentiale and the categoriale elements of Heidegger's ontology, largely to separate
off the categoriale, as that is the dimension in which he will most confront modern
ontology. It is also important here that his formulation of the problematic proceeds
from "being-in-the-world" as we most immediately confront it in experience, as
opposed to the traditional orientation based on existent "present at hand" entities over
against which one projects the question of the being of such entities, the traditional
orientation pointing somewhat naturally to a conception of being as substance. It also
indicates how world enters as the ontological background for the analysis of things,
which are taken apriori as innerworldly entities. Finally, in Section 3.3, we have seen
how Heidegger specifically articulates the part/whole forms of his own and Descartes'
worldly parts and makes this the central issue on which the "destruction" of Descartes'
ontology is carried out. And the specific part/whole form which Heidegger opposes to
the form of Cartesian substance is represented as the "with . . . in . . ." structure,
which we've sought to explain and illustrate.
The introduction reviewed some· of the recent studies of Husserl's Third
Investigation, but preference was given to an interpretation which I've referred to as
the Willard hypothesis. The effort made to explicate and give priority to this interpre-
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tation was not merely for the sake of establishing an interesting adjunctive thesis to
the main study of part/whole relations. Rather, it is important to see Husserl's work
generally proceeds from the sort of perspective established by Willard (though I would
certainly include also Sokolowski's view as viable) in order to counter a certain
tendency toward formalizing Husserl's part/whole theory without any attention to how
the theory functions in its phenomenological context. This, I think, is a mistake.
The proper way to convey the part/whole forms uncovered phenomenologically is through descriptions that are conducive to their categorial intuition, as with
other Husserlian categories. Husserl's suggestions toward a pure formalization of a
system of part/whole relations would be poorly understood, if these forms are not
themselves grounded in the intuitive element characteristic of what he calls "authentic
thinking," a concept whose significance it has been argued goes back to his early
concerns with the possibility of blind calculation (the purely analytic manipulation of
mathematical symbols). It is also, I think, a misunderstanding of phenomenology to
take it as a sort of ideological opposition to formal, mathematical philosophy. We
should rather take Husserl's own admonitions to formalize more seriously: a mathematical formalization of any of the concepts, theses, discoveries would serve to elevate
them and give them more theoretical leverage. That this is in many ways possible is
evident from some of the recent literature on Husserl. That the part/whole forms are
categorial means, within Husserl's phenomenology, that they are to be exhibited in
experience, i.e., either though a perceptwµ or imaginative intuition, or through a
categorial intuition founded on some concatenation of perceptual or imaginative
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intuitions-in either case, the forms must show themselves in experience. What
distinguishes Husserl from the empiricists is that what shows itself in experience can
be shown as pertaining to its a priori; and far from this apriori being founded on the
"mind" (as "mental connections," "associations," or the like), the apriori is thought by
Husserl to belong to the things themselves.
It has been most important to approach the Husserlian theory in the right way

for exhibiting its effect on Heidegger's early work. It is important to see that methodologically Heidegger is himself exhibiting the part/whole forms encountered in his
analysis of the being of the world and innerworldly entities in just the fashion prescribed by Husserl in the Third Investigation. And establishing such an approach was
the primary intention of the Introduction. Yet, there was a further reason for the
theme developed in the Introduction. There is an intrinsic interest in the problems
Husserl addresses in the Third Investigation, and it is important to be clear on the
perspective from which he is addressing them. It was from this perspective, the
perspective of phenomenology, that Heidegger's application of the theory ought to be
understood. The effect of Heidegger's application has reverberated throughout the
continental literature and continues to reverberate. The destruction of the history of
ontology, the destruction of substantiality, the radical new view of temporality
developed in BT, the theme of the world's worldhood, so many elements of BT have
become a part of the basic stock of continental thinking that it would be difficult to
say what continental philosophy would be without the ground and horizons that
Heidegger opened in BT. If Husserl's part/whole theory is as essential to the famous
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"destruction" as I have maintained it is, then we can trace a sort of trajectory of the
problem from Husserl's perplexity over the problem of inauthentic mathematical
thinking to the post-BT styles of contemporary continental philosophy. From Husserl
comes the formal leverage of a philosophy attentive to necessity. LI is a work on the
philosophy of logic, concerned with the character of evidence as well as with necessity. The explosion of formal possibilities in continental philosophy is frequently
indebted to innovations rooted in phenomenology. And thus the trajectory of Husserl's
early reflections can be seen through and beyond BT in its effects on contemporary
philosophy. And it is largely with a view to that trajectory that I've wanted the course
of the Husserlian problematic and theory, through the Heideggerian application, to be
seen.

Where the course of continental philosophy can be read as a formalist enterprise, the techniques of symbolic logicians might well find delightful themes for
representation. This was Husserl's hope in venturing his six theorems toward an
axiomatic development of the pure theory of parts and wholes. The theory of parts
and wholes is, of course, only one of many formal innovations of Husserl which invite
the efforts of symbolic formalists, though it is possibly the part of Husserl's work to
have most recently received such attention. Peter Simons comes closest to an adequate formalization of the part/whole theory, and his formalization brings out important questions about the Third Investigation. Yet he seems to show very little interest
in phenomenology per se, as is indicated by the lack of phenomenological works in
the extensive bibliography appended to Parts. Moreover, he tests the adequacy of his
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own interpretations of the six theorems in a way that utterly bypasses the categorial
intuition of what those theorems are concerned with; that is, he tests the adequacy of
his interpretations by merely applying the test of intuitive validity to ordinary propositions formalized according to the rules of the system. Clearly Husserl's doctrine of
categorial intuition would suggest that he placed greater emphasis on the revision of
intuition, a revision enabled by the leverage of a proper formalization. Such a
concerted interplay of the formal and intuitive is essential to Husserl's method. Unlike
with the more recent "ordinary language" bent of contemporary symbolic formalists,
Husserl was much closer in perspective to the mathematical tradition of discovering
and proving forms and relations as possibilities of objects-his was a much more
objectifying formalism. In fact, the discovery of objective forms is such a preoccupation in his own work, that Husserl virtually dispenses with symbolization, only
occasionally resorting to it to make little pictograms of relations easily set out in that
form.
There have been several excellent studies of Husserl's application of his
part/whole theory to other elements of phenomenology, which we considered in the
Introduction. In the chapter on Husserl, I have sought to develop similar insights,
though the emphasis is on seeing the role of the part/whole theory in phenomenology
in those aspect most relevant to a study of the early Heidegger, as well as attempting
to clarify a view of the most essential elements of the theory in general, offering some
of my own intuitive models of the forms in question. These studies (esp. Willard,
Sokolowski, Cooper-Wiele) appear to me to achieve a more adequate understanding of
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the Husserlian forms; and perhaps these sorts of non-symbolizing studies are a
necessary propaedeutic to any adequate symbolic formulation of the theory. That
would have been an excellent goal for the present dissertation: first develop the theory
on the side of its objectifying intuitive concepts, and then go for an adequate formalization. However, I thought it more useful to do something which, as far as I know,
has not been done, by showing the influence beyond the interior of Husserl's own
work to the very important keynote of so much of contemporary philosophy, which is
Heideggers concept of the worldhood of the world and the concomitant destruction of
the modem ontology that first appears philosophically in Descartes. This does more, I
think, to show the contemporary logical pertinence of the Third Investigation and to
make clear what there is to be formalized here in the first place. This is the only
rational ground for a rapprochement of continental and analytic schools of thought,
that the intrinsic interest of the formality of the problem should be evident in its many
ramifications to both schools.
We can consider the central moment of Heideggers destruction of Cartesian
ontology to be his critique of substance and substantiality, with its opposition by the
model of innerworldliness as the essential categorial form of those things that philosophy has traditionally taken as present at hand. Far from the first to find the concept of
substance problematic, what distinguishes Heideggers attack on the concept is its
formal character. He first sets out to find what constitutes the substantia/ity of
substantial entities or substances. Others have critiqued the concept of substance on
grounds relating more to the materiality of substance, perhaps, as with the phenomen-
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alists, arguing that a conjunction of directly evident properties suffices to account for
what is evident, while the assumption of something underlying those properties is
merely a superfluous assumption. From a Heideggerian perspective, however, this
really makes no essential conceptual difference, as the substantiality of things (their
substantial form) is left intact (as, of course, for the phenomenalist, is whole point of
dispensing with the assumption-things are left conceptually intact without it). But I
do not mean here to foster the impression that I think that Heidegger is a formalist. It
was not just by happenstance that Heidegger chose to attack Cartesian substance
formally, nor that he brought a part/whole analysis in as an element of his critique of
Descartes' ontology. The point is that Cartesianism is founded on a certain thesis
regarding the world and the essence of things in the world: that the parts of the world
are related through their extensive attributes (their spatiality) to the whole and as
independent, side-by-side pieces of the whole; and they are related through a last
common genus (substance-that very independence, side-by-sideness, etc.) to that
whole and as belonging to the same last genus as the whole. That is, Husserl's definition of an extensive whole is a perfect description of the form of Descartes ens

creatum, or the world. What Heidegger does is address the issue of form when form
is at issue. And I see no evidence from this either that Heidegger was a formalist or

•

that he was in principle opposed to formalization, in spite of his polemical stance
against empty formalizations, which, he says, are always true on account of their
triviality.
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We have emphasized Heidegger's application of the part/whole theory to the
ontology of ordinary objective things. This is the "categorial" application of the
theory. But Heidegger's ontology has another side to it, which is the "existential"
analysis; the most explicit discussion of "wholes" is of course the problem of the
whole of Dasein. However the possibility of discussing the existential analysis of
Dasein requires first the destruction of substantiality in the categorial realm, as that is
where the concept arises, and it is through an application of the concepts and forms of
analysis developed for things to our own kind of being that the main problems of
subjectivity arise. And therefore it has been most important to show how Husserl's
theory serves a destruction of the concept of substance at the source.
As an example of the gener-

ality of the problems addressed in
the Third Investigation for continen-
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ARBOR

••

EQUOS

tal philosophy, we might wish to
contemplate the very different way in
which structuralism, without the
benefit of phenomenological ontology, encounters a problem in the na-

etc.

etc.

ture of language. We find this re-

Figure: Course in General Linguistics.
markable picture of "side-by-side"
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existence in Saussure's Course in General Linguistics. 156 Saussure's intention here is
to represent what he takes as a sort of conventional view of the reality of language,
and it is a view he argues against based on his own theory of language as a system of
oppositions. Unfortunately, he still tries to locate language patterns in the brain as
their ultimate source, even claims that linguistics is properly a branch of psychology.
From the perspective of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology, it is evident that
what occurs in the depicted view is that both the signifier ("arbor") and what is
signified (the tree itself) are taken as present at hand entities (as realities, actually)
which are subsequently associated in such a way that one of the entities comes to be a
sign for the other. It is still a common ~ew in analytic circles. Saussure is compelled
to oppose it on account of his view of language as a system of oppositional elements,
where the unity of sign and signifier cuts a two-sided distinction, a distinction both on
the side of sign and signifier. But our purpose here is not to review the tenants of
structuralism; it is rather to note how the paradoxes of Cartesianism emerge whenever
ontological moments are set piece-wise in relation to one another. Saussure, so close
to grasping the problem, still falls into a certain Cartesian trap by feeling the compulsion to say where language is (how does it stand extensionally to the other parts of
extensive reality?).
Finally, the structure I've described in the previous section as co-reference,
exemplified by the "with . . . in . . .11 structure, is a familiar basis of reasoning

156

Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, translated by Roy
Harris (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1983), 65.
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throughout much of the continental literature, though the fact of this structure's
belonging to a logic has not yet occasioned sufficient serious attention to provoke a
study its behavior in formal systems. This is most likely due to a lack of joint ·
expertise in the continental literature and the analytic. I hope to have made some
progress toward at least isolating some of these operative logical elements of continental reasoning in this study in Husserl's theory of parts and wholes. Whether a
symbolic formalization ensues from such discoveries, and particularly whether one
develops an algebraic or axiomatic expression of them, to merely make these essential
forms explicit, as Husserl understood, is the most essential labor of logic. Logic, after
all, is not only to be developed, but employed in scholarship, in uncovering the logical
dimensions of texts, and uncovering it in them in the way they actually are. A large
portion of the splendor of continental philosophy in this century lies in the logical
powers of its major writers. Perhaps one has traditionally acquired this logic mimetically, through practice in the reading and writing of works fraught with these forms of
reasoning. Explicitly isolating, aspectualizing attention to the forms in their own right
always serves to heighten ones command and appreciation; and it is above all this that
makes it academically essential.
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